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No: GPERC71 
The effects of gender inequality, wages, wealth concentration and fiscal policy on 
macroeconomic performance  
Executive summary  
The aim of this paper is to develop a macroeconomic model to analyse the effects of multiple 
dimensions of inequalities and fiscal policies on macroeconomic outcomes.  The theoretical 
novelty is to develop a unified model, integrating i) the impact of three dimensions of 
inequalities –functional income distribution between wages and profits, gender inequality, 
and wealth concentration, and their interactions; ii) the impact of fiscal policies, particularly 
the effects of government spending in social vs. physical infrastructure, and different types of 
taxation; iii) both the demand and supply-side effects; iv) effects on both output and 
employment. 
 
We build a three sector gendered model with social sector (health, social care, education, 
child care), the rest of the market economy, and unpaid care sectors and three types of factors 
of production -male and female labour, and capital. On the demand side, we model 
behavioural equations determining consumption, private investment, exports, imports and 
government spending. On the supply side, productivity changes in the medium-run as an 
outcome of changes in wages, public and private expenditure and unpaid care. Hours of 
employment in the social sector and the rest of the economy are determined by output and 
labour productivity in the relevant sectors, and social norms about occupational segregation 
determines hours of employment of women and men in both sectors. Wealth concentration 
depends on functional income distribution and wealth tax. 
 
We estimate this general model econometrically for the UK using time series data for the 
period of 1970-2016. For the medium-run estimation of productivity we use panel data of 18 
industries for the period of 1970-2015. We find that an upward convergence in wages, i.e. 
increasing wages with closing gender pay gap in both sectors leads to higher output in both 
the short and the medium-run. The UK is both wage-led and gender equality-led, and hence 
equality-led. However the positive impact on productivity is stronger in the medium-run than 
on output, which leads to a fall in employment of both men and women. The positive impact 
of public social infrastructure investment on both output and employment is much higher, and 
despite a strong positive effect on productivity, employment of both men and women increase 
in the medium-run as well. A policy mix of upward convergence in wages and public social 
infrastructure investment has a strong positive impact on output and women’s employment, 
but men’s employment decreases in the medium-run.  Public debt/GDP also falls as an 
outcome of this policy mix. A policy mix of upward convergence in wages and public 
investment in both social and physical infrastructure leads to a higher increase in output, and 
employment of both men and women increase both in the short and the medium-run. 
However, public debt/GDP increases marginally in the medium-run in this policy mix, and an 
increase in tax rates is required to improve public debt/GDP. An increase in the progressivity 
of income taxation in the form of increasing tax rate on capital income and decreasing tax 
rate on labour income increases output, men’s and women’s employment, and decreases 
public debt/GDP in both the short and the medium-run. An increase in the tax rate on wealth 
decreases wealth concentration, and has a positive and the strongest impact on output, 
employment and the budget. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to develop a macroeconomic model to analyse the effects of 
multiple dimensions of inequalities, and fiscal policies on macroeconomic outcomes.  The 
theoretical novelty is to develop a unified model, integrating i) the impact of three 
dimensions of inequalities –functional income distribution between wages and profits, gender 
inequality, and wealth concentration, and their interactions; ii) the impact of labour market 
policies which effect wage rates and gender pay gap, and fiscal policies, particularly the 
effects of government spending in social vs. physical infrastructure, and different types of 
taxation; iii) both the demand and supply-side effects; iv) effects on both output and 
employment. An implicit aim is to contribute to gendering macroeconomics by incorporating 
gendered behavioural differences and the role of social norms in the model. 
A distinctive feature of the last four decades prior to the Great Recession has been a rise in 
multiple dimensions of inequality. There has been a sharp polarization of personal income 
distribution (Atkinson et al., 2011) as well as a significant change in functional income 
distribution, i.e. a fall in the share of labour income in national income in both developed and 
developing countries (IMF, 2009; ILO, 2012; Stockhammer, 2016; Onaran and Galanis, 
2014). There has been also a remarkable increase in wealth concentration (Piketty, 2014; 
Piketty and Zucman, 2014; Alvaredo, et al., 2017; Goda et al, 2016). Meanwhile, despite 
improvements in legal rights and education, gender gaps in income and employment remain 
very high and women do the vast majority of unpaid domestic care, which reinforces gender 
gaps in employment and wages and occupational segregation further (ILO, 2018a, b).  
There is a growing recognition that inequality deters growth and stability, and has been an 
important contributing factor to the financial crisis in 2008 (Stiglitz, 2011; Kumhof et al., 
2015, 2012; Kumhof and Ranciere, 2010; Rajan, 2010; Milanovic, 2011; Fitoussi and 
Saraceno, 2010; Goda and Lysandrou, 2014). One strand of research on the impact of 
inequality focuses on personal income distribution, e.g. recent research at the OECD and the 
IMF (IMF, 2009; Berg et al., 2012; Cingano 2014), based on reduced form econometric 
analysis of macro panel data, argue that inequality may impede growth due to supply side 
factors such as barriers to human capital accumulation or political risk, building on new 
institutionalist political economy (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). While this literature moves beyond the 
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Kuznets (1955) hypothesis on inequality and growth, demand side factors which are crucial 
in economies with excess capacity, are not analysed. 
Another strand focuses on the impact of functional income distribution on the demand 
side, in particular on consumption and private investment building on post-Keynesian/post-
Kaleckian demand-led macroeconomic models (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Onaran and 
Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Onaran et al, 2011; Stockhammer et al., 2009; Hein 
and Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2006/7; Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004). These 
models and the empirical estimations allow for both positive and negative effects of a fall in 
the labour share on the components of aggregate demand. Extensions to these demand and 
distribution-led macroeconomic models further integrate the impact of public spending and 
taxes (Blecker, 2002; Mott and Slattery, 1994; Hein, 2018; Palley, 2009; 2013a; 2014a; You 
and Dutt, 1996; Dutt, 2013a; Tavani and Zamparelli, 2017a; Allain, 2015; Ko, 2018; 
Commendatore et al., 2011; Obst et al., 2019). Going beyond the short-run demand effects in 
this strand of models, a series of papers also integrate the interaction of income distribution 
and productivity into demand-led macroeconomic models (Palley, 1996, 2012a, 2013b, 
2014b; Casetti, 2003; Dutt, 2006, 2010, 2011, 2013b; Naastepad, 2006; Setterfield, 2006; 
Hein and Tarassow, 2010; Tavani and Zamparelli, 2017b); however these models do not 
include the public sector. Seguino (2010; 2012) extends these models by integrating public 
spending and productivity and incorporates the effects of gender wage gaps, however does 
not present an empirical analysis. 
Among the macro models on the impact of gender inequality on growth, one strand again 
focuses on the supply side effects of gender inequality and intra household bargaining on 
fertility, savings of the household and the accumulation of human capital within the context 
of endogenous growth models (Becker et al., 1990; Doepke and Tertilt, 2009, 2014, 2016; 
Agenor and Agenor, 2014; Agenor and Canuto, 2015; Cavalcanti and Tavares, 2016). Fukui 
et al. (2019) develop a formal multi-region general equilibrium model, augmenting the real 
business cycle models with unpaid home production along the lines of Benhabib et al. (1991) 
and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), and show that increases in female employment during 
the “Grand Gender Convergence” in employment over the past half-century in the US 
translate into increases in total employment with little (and statistically insignificant) 
crowding out of men in the labour market. One important finding is that the entrance of 
women into the market sector has much smaller income effects on the labour supply of men 
compared to findings in earlier research by Jones et al., (2015), Heathcote et al., (2017), 
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Knowles (2013), when the utility for men from women’s unpaid household production is 
incorporated to the model.   
Cross-country empirical analysis regarding the impact of gender equality, mostly based on 
reduced form aggregate estimations of growth, focus on the supply side effects of equality in 
education and labour force participation, via the direct and indirect/intergenerational effects 
on productivity, because women are assumed to spend more on children’s education and 
health relative to men (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Esteve-Volart, 
2000; Knowles, et al., 2002; Morrison et al., 2007; Klasen and Lamanna 2009; Amin, et al., 
2015; Gonzales et al., 2015; Cuberes and Teignier, 2014; Seguino, 2017).   Reductions in 
labour market imperfections such as wage discrimination and occupational segregation are 
expected to stimulate growth in most cases. However, Seguino (2017) highlights that most of 
these models do not account for problems related to the demand side to ensure increases in 
female education and labour force participation are matched by sufficient labour demand.   
Among gendered macro models, Braunstein et al. (2011) and Seguino (2010, 2012) 
incorporate both demand and supply side analysis within post-Kaleckian theoretical models, 
albeit without an empirical analysis, allowing for both positive and negative effects of gender 
equality on the demand side depending on the structural features of the economy and 
incorporating the positive effects on the supply side. Braunstein et al. (2011) model the 
impact of gender differences in income on consumption, investment, output, and 
productivity, but do not present an explicit modelling of the government sector. Informed by 
contributions from gender studies and sociology, this strand of feminist analysis of the macro 
economy treats labour as a produced means of production, as opposed to conventional 
macroeconomic models: the reproduction of labour is carried out by both paid and unpaid 
work, and women have a disproportionate share of unpaid work relative to men. Braunstein et 
al. (2018) analyse how care models, globalization and macroeconomic policy stance shape 
the development trajectories of different economies using a principle component analysis.   
Another body of empirical research focusing on the demand side effects of gender gaps, 
uses input-output tables to analyse the impact of public spending in social care and education, 
and show the stronger effect of this type of fiscal spending on female employment as well as 
total employment compared to public investment in physical infrastructure (Antonopoulos et 
al., 2010; Ilkkaracan et al., 2015; Ilkkaracan and Kim, 2018; De Henau et al., 2016), 
Antonopoulos et al. (2010) and Ilkkaracan et al. (2015) extend this analysis using micro 
household data to match the macro labour demand with personal characteristics of the 
population to analyse the effects on employment of women and men. However, these studies 
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are based on a static analysis, and do not take the medium-run productivity effects into 
account.  
Pollitt et al (2017) use a demand-led Post-Keynesian econometric model to simulate the 
impact of gender pay gaps on growth, however changes in income distribution has only 
supply side effects and does not affect consumption and demand directly in their model; 
similarly wages or government spending in social infrastructure does not affect productivity. 
In a similar vein, Bargawi and Cozzi (2017) use a global demand-led model (Cambridge 
Alphametrics Model) without gendered variables to assess the impact of government 
expenditure in social infrastructure in what they call a gendered expansionary growth 
scenario. 
Regarding the impact of wealth inequality, Boyer (2000), Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), 
van Treeck (2009) Skott and Ryoo (2008), Ryoo and Skott (2013) and Hein (2018) 
incorporate wealth effects in Post-Keynesian macroeconomic models, however, theoretical 
macro models integrating the impact of wealth inequality on output are only newly emerging 
(Taylor et al., 2015, 2018; Petach and Tavani, 2018; Palley, 2012b; 2017; Ederer and Rehm, 
2018; Zamparelli, 2016;  Botta et al, 2019), and the few exceptions in the macroeconometric 
analysis of inequality on output only integrate the impact of total wealth on consumption or 
investment rather than wealth inequality (e.g. Onaran et al., 2011; Stockhammer and 
Wildauer, 2016; Stockhammer et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2015; Zezza, 2009). This misses an 
important channel as micro-econometric evidence shows that marginal propensity to consume 
out of wealth differs across the wealth distribution (Arrondel et al., 2015; Mian et al., 2013). 
Wealth concentration is likely to have significant consequences also for investment due to 
both credit constraints and its impact on the financialization of the real economy, and is 
essential for a full analysis of the impact of inequalities on the macro economy. Moreover, 
greater wealth concentration could also be reflected in the market concentration in different 
sectors by restricting middle and upper-middle income individuals’ capability of entry. A 
high market concentration reduces the incentives to invest and innovate as shown in 
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) and the IMF (2019).  
Synthesizing these different strands in an integrated general model, this paper aims at 
developing a novel gendered macroeconomic analysis building on structuralist, Post-
Keynesian, and feminist economics and gender studies. Our aim is to develop a general 
theory, which allows for the possibility of different outcomes depending on the values of the 
behavioural parameters; e.g. inequalities may increase or decrease output and employment, or 
6 
 
government spending may lead to lower or higher investment and productivity, both 
potentially with different effects in the short and medium-run. 
We present a three sector gendered model with social sector (health, social care, 
education, child care), the rest of the market economy, and unpaid care sectors and three 
types of factors of production -male and female labour, and capital. On the demand side, we 
model behavioural equations determining consumption, private investment, exports, imports 
and government spending. On the supply side, productivity changes in the medium-run as an 
outcome of changes in wages, public and private expenditure and unpaid care. Hours of 
employment in the social sector and the rest of the economy are determined by output and 
labour productivity in the relevant sectors and social norms about occupational segregation 
determines hours of employment of women and men in both sectors.  
We estimate this general model econometrically for the UK using time series data for the 
period of 1970-2016. For the medium-run estimation of productivity we use panel data of 18 
industries for the period of 1970-2015. The estimated parameters are used to develop an 
empirical analysis of the impacts of inequalities and policies via both the demand and supply 
side effects, moving beyond the mainstream analysis (e.g. IMF, 2009; Cingano 2014), which 
is focused on the supply-side and personal income inequality.  
 In terms of the macroeconomic outcomes we analyse the effects on output, employment 
of men and women, public debt, private net wealth (net wealth), and productivity. The 
analysis of employment, gender employment gaps, and inequalities, rather than simply 
output, thereby broadening the policy impact analysis beyond the narrow measure of GDP is 
another aim of the paper. Other UK empirical macro models, such as those used by the Bank 
of England (see Burgess et al., 2013) or the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2013) do 
not address the impacts of inequalities. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 and 
4 analyse the impact of labour market and fiscal policies based on the theoretical model. 
Section 5 presents the data, estimation methodology and estimation results. Section 6 
analyses the effects of changes in wages, gender pay gap, public spending in social and 
physical infrastructure and tax rates on capital income, wealth and labour income based on 
the empirical estimations, and presents scenarios based on a mix of labour market and fiscal 
policies. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The model  
The model is structuralist, i.e. structural features of the economy and society, such as the 
existence of excess capacity, involuntary unemployment, oligopolistic market structure and 
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price setting by firms, the structure of production and resulting price elasticities, inequalities 
(income and wealth distribution and gender inequality), social norms, the distribution of 
unpaid domestic care labour between men and women, and the form and extent of gendered 
job segregation (e.g. women’s association with paid care work) play a crucial role in 
determining economic behaviour and macroeconomic outcomes.  
Features regarding gendered behaviour and social norms such as reciprocity, caring, and 
non-selfish motives, which are largely absent from macroeconomics, are integrated to the 
behavioural specifications. Social norms, individual motivation of men and women, and 
public preferences, alongside the structure of the social welfare state, are important in 
determining the different gendered behaviour of men and women (Seguino, 2017). 
Consequently, a change in gender pay gap or public spending in social vs. physical 
infrastructure may have gendered short and medium-run impacts on employment and income.  
Wage rates are determined exogenously as an outcome of a bargaining process between 
employers and workers, and labour market institutions. Gender pay gap is also determined 
exogenously depending on relative bargaining power of women, social norms, occupational 
segregation effected by these norms, availability of social care, labour market policies and 
legislation, as well as differences in personal characteristics such as education which in turn 
are affected by social norms. Gender gaps may be the result of women’s disproportionate 
responsibility for unpaid care work, stereotypes that lead to occupational segregation, or 
wage gaps in favour of men leading families to select the lowest-paid adult to provide unpaid 
care work (Seguino, 2017).  
Functional income distribution is determined endogenously, as the wage share of men and 
women and profit share change when wages, output, employment and productivity change. 
Wealth concentration changes endogenously depending on after-tax functional income 
distribution and wealth tax. 
We do not model the impact of wage inequality between other types of workers, such as 
low vs. high skilled or managerial workers, in order to focus on the impact of gender, 
functional income and wealth distribution. However, the theoretical framework can be 
extended to analyse behavioural differences among other heterogeneous agents, e.g. different 
types of workers. Moreover, from an empirical point of view, the distribution of income 
between wages and profits has significant consequences for personal income distribution, 
hence the latter is largely captured by functional income distribution.   
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In the rest of this section we present the structure of the model. Appendix 1 presents the 
list of variables and definitions. Aggregate output (𝑌𝑡) is the sum of total male wage bill 
(𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀), total female wage bill (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹), and profits (𝑅𝑡).  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑅𝑡 (1) 
 The total wage bill for female workers (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹) is a function of female wages in the 
social sector (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹), female employment in the social sector (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹), female wages in the rest 
of the economy (𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹), and female employment in the rest of the economy (𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹), and H 
denotes the social sector and N the rest of the economy: 
 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 (2) 
Similarly the total wage bill for male workers (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀) is a function of male wages in the 
social sector (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀), male employment in the social sector (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀), male wages in the rest of 
the economy (𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀), and male employment in the rest of the economy (𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀): 
 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 + 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 (3) 
All wage rates are defined as hourly real wages and employment is defined as total hours 
worked by persons engaged in the respective sector. Working with hours of employment as 
opposed to headcount figures is important for a gendered macro analysis to reflect the high 
share of women in part-time work.  
As shown in Figure 1, the average wages in both H and N sectors are significantly larger 
for male workers in the UK. Following this, we define gender wage gaps (𝛼𝑡) for wages in H 
and N sectors as below:  
 
𝛼𝑡
𝑁 =
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 > 1,      𝛼𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 > 1  
(4) 
Figure 1 here 
The aggregate output in the market economy (GDP, excluding unpaid activities) is:  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐶 + 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑋𝑡 −𝑀𝑡 (5) 
where 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 is households’ social expenditures1,  𝐶𝑡
𝑁 is consumption in the rest of the 
economy, 𝐼𝑡 is private investment expenditures, 𝐺𝑡
𝐻  is government’s social infrastructure 
expenditures (in health, social care, education, child care) , 𝐺𝑡
𝐶  is government’s consumption 
expenditures, 𝐼𝑡
𝐺  is public investments other than investments in the social sector2, 𝑋𝑡 is 
 
1 While theoretically household consumption of social services amount to investment in human infrastructure 
and affects productivity in our model, as discussed below, we preserve the term “consumption” for this category 
consistent with the definitions in national accounts. 
2 Government’s social infrastructure expenditures are classified as current spending on labour services in the 
national accounts. The physical infrastructure associated with providing social infrastructure such as schools and 
hospitals are counted as physical infrastructure. Hence part of 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 also contributes to social infrastructure. 
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exports of goods and services and 𝑀𝑡 is imports of goods and services.  In line with the 
feminist economics literature emphasizing the importance of government’s social 
expenditures on productivity and social fabric, we refer to 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 as public social infrastructure 
investment in the rest of the paper (Elson, 2016, 2017; Women’s Budget Group, 2015). The 
public social expenditures is a fiscal policy decision targeted as a share of aggregate output 
(𝜅𝑡
𝐻), and constitutes the public social sector output (𝑌𝑡
𝐻)3. The rest of the GDP is the market 
output in the rest of economy (𝑌𝑡
𝑁): 
 𝑌𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡 (6) 
  𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑌𝑡(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) (7) 
The share of government’s consumption expenditures (𝐺𝑡
𝐶) and public investments other 
than social infrastructure investment in the social sector (𝐼𝑡
𝐺) are also determined by 
government as a share of aggregate output and are respectively 𝜅𝑡
𝐶 and 𝜅𝑡
𝐺: 
 𝐺𝑡
𝐶 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝑡 (8) 
 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐺𝑌𝑡 (9) 
Hours of employment in the social sector and the rest of the economy are determined by 
output and labour productivity in the relevant sectors and social norms about occupational 
segregation determines the share of men and women in total hours of employment in both 
sectors. Analysing the effects on not just output but also employment is a novel feature of the 
paper compared to previous research on the macroeconomic impact of inequalities, which we 
believe is crucial to go beyond a narrow GDP focused policy impact analysis and broaden the 
targets to include other factors that affect wellbeing and social cohesion. The real world 
structuralist features of the model reflect that employment is demand-constrained in an 
economy where there is excess capacity and involuntary unemployment, and supply 
constraints are discussed as part of labour supply behaviour below.  
The employment in sector N is output over labour productivity sector N (𝑇𝑡
𝑁): 
 𝐸𝑡
𝑁 =
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 =
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) 𝑌𝑡
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  (10) 
 
However, our classification is important for a gendered analysis of the employment impact of different fiscal 
policy decisions as 𝐺𝑡
𝐻is very female labour intensive while construction, just as most other parts of 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 is male 
labour intensive. 
3 For simplicity, we assume that sector H only consists of the public social sector. The employment and supply 
in this sector is entirely financed by public social expenditures. The households’ private social consumption (see 
equation 21) is supplied by the private market output in the rest of economy (𝑌𝑡
𝑁). Hence, private social 
consumption do not directly contribute to the generation of employment in sector H; however, they affect labour 
productivity positively as discussed below.      
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In our model, the share of female employment in sector N is exogenously determined by 
social norms determining occupational segregation, and is demonstrated by 𝛽𝑡
𝑁. The male 
workers in sector N constitute (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁) of the sector: 
 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 =
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) 𝑌𝑡
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 𝛽𝑡
𝑁  =    
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 𝛽𝑡
𝑁 (11) 
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 =
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) 𝑌𝑡
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)  =    
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁) (12) 
We assume that the wage bill paid to male and female workers in the social sector 
constitutes the public social expenditures and the social sector is not making profits. Any 
non-labour inputs used constitute part of government consumption (𝐺𝐶). Following this, the 
public social expenditure can be written as a function of employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻), average female 
wage (𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻), average male wage (𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝐻), female employment share (𝛽𝑡
𝐻) and male 
employment share (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻) in the social sector.  
 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀 (13) 
Figure 1 also shows that female employment share in H has been larger than female 
employment share in N in the UK. Onaran et al (2019) observed a larger female employment 
share in H for 13 emerging economies. Therefore, in our model we assume that 𝛽𝑡
𝐻 is larger 
than 𝛽𝑡
𝑁. 
Using equations (13) and (4), we can write the total employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻), female 
employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹) and male employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀) in the social sector as a function of public 
social expenditures and female wages in the social sector. 
 𝐸𝑡
𝐻 =
𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
=
𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
 (14) 
 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
  (15) 
 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 =
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
 (16) 
We model the unpaid domestic care labour (𝑈𝑡) within the households as  
log
𝑈𝑡
𝑁𝑡
= 𝑞0 + 𝑞𝐺 log
(𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐻)
𝑁𝑡
 (17) 
For a given demographic structure and population (N) which determines the care needs of 
a society, (𝑞0), higher per capita government expenditures or household consumption in the 
social sector are expected to reduce the need in households for unpaid care; therefore, it 
would lead to lower per capita unpaid labour (𝑞𝐺 < 0). We specify the equation in logs, since 
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the impact of social expenditures on the time spent on unpaid domestic care might be non-
linear, i.e. the negative impact might be decreasing in absolute values as it gets increasingly 
more difficult to substitute unpaid care at lower levels of unpaid care. The potential squeeze 
in unpaid care due to paid employment is excluded to simplify the model. The effect of 
𝐺𝑡
𝐻and 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 as determinants of employment only partially reflects this effect. 
Next, we define the profits (𝑅) in N. The income in N is distributed between wages and 
profits.4 The profit income is the operating surplus in N after wage payments. 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −  𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹  − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑁 − 𝐸𝑡
𝑁(𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝛼𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
= ((1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
𝑁(𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝛼𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹) 
(18) 
The profit share in N (𝜋𝑡) is the share of profits in output in N. The profit share can also be 
written as a function of female wages and labour productivity in N: 
 𝜋𝑡 =
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −  𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹  − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 1 − 
(𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝛼𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  (19) 
On the demand side of the economy, we model behavioural specifications for 
consumption, private investment, exports, imports, tax revenues and government spending. 
The next set of equations present the behavioural equations defining the demand side.    
Household consumption behaviour is a function of after tax income, which in turn is 
income from female and male waged employment and profits, and private net wealth (private 
assets-debt) of two groups, the net wealth of the top 1% (𝑃𝑊1) and the bottom 99% (𝑃𝑊99). 
Due to data availability, it is not possible to disaggregate wealth alongside functional income 
distribution categories such as those earning wage vs. profit income or by gender. It is also 
not possible to disaggregate debt along personal or functional income distribution categories; 
therefore we use net wealth disaggregated by income percentiles to analyse the impact of 
wealth inequality and private debt. Total household consumption in two types of goods and 
services produced in the social sector and the rest of the economy depends on the differences 
in the marginal propensities to consume out of female and male wage income and capital 
income, and will be affected by changes in wages, functional income distribution and gender 
gaps. Both accounting for gendered categories of wage earners and wealth inequality in the 
consumption function are novel features.  
Aggregate consumption of households in goods and services in the rest of the economy is: 
 
4 The workers save and own wealth and may receive capital income as well, which is part of the operating 
surplus. 
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log 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑅 log[𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)]
+ 𝑐𝐹 log[(𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹)(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]
+ 𝑐𝑀 log[(𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀)(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1 log(𝑃𝑊1𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) + 𝑐𝑃𝑊99 log(𝑃𝑊99𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) 
(20) 
where 𝑡𝑡
𝑅 is the implicit tax rate (ITR) on capital income, 𝑡𝑡
𝑊is the ITR on labour income, and 
𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 is the ITR on wealth. The marginal propensity to consume in N is assumed to be 
different for male and female workers, reflecting the gender pay gaps as well as differences in 
behaviour. We discuss this in more detail below while presenting the analysis of the model.  
With respect to the effect of household wealth in the form of both financial and real estate 
assets on consumption, there are several channels to consider. In the 1990s the wealth effect 
in the consumption function has been rediscovered, motivated by the increase in private 
consumption expenditures in the USA, which was attributed to the rise in the value of 
financial assets during the stock market boom (Onaran et al., 2011; Boone et al. 1998). In 
2000s, the focus turned to the effect of booming house prices on consumption. In line with 
the fact that residential property is more frequently accepted as collateral, there is empirical 
evidence that the marginal propensity to consume out of property wealth is substantially 
higher than out of financial assets, in particular in the UK (Case et al 2001; Catte et al. 2004; 
Girouard et al. 2006; Linder, 2014; Slacalek, 2009; Goodhart and Hoffman, 2008). Rising 
inequality also plays a role. As wages have stagnated in many countries, but consumption 
norms have increased, many households have been driven into debt (Cynamon and Fazzari, 
2008; Brown, 2008). Barba and Pivetti (2009) and Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) argue that 
increasing house prices help households with risky mortgages (part of the 𝑃𝑊99 in our 
model) to get refinance loans, and are thereby able to relax their budget constraint for 
consumption. Unfortunately we cannot disaggregate financial and household wealth and debt 
for different percentiles. Overall we expect a positive effect of an increase in the private net 
wealth of both groups due to access to credit and improved consumer confidence, and the 
effects are likely to be more significant for 𝑃𝑊99, i.e. the wealth of the more budget 
constrained group. There are also offsetting mechanisms; e.g. Buiter (2010) argues that the 
positive effects of higher house prices for owners may be offset by higher costs for renters.    
The households’ social expenditures (𝐶𝑡
𝐻) is also a function of after tax profits and wage 
bills of female and male workers sectors, net private wealth, and governments’ social 
expenditures:  
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log 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑧0 + 𝑧𝑅 log[𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)]
+ 𝑧𝐹 log[(𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹)(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]
+ 𝑧𝑀 log[(𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀)(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1log (𝑃𝑊1𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) + 𝑧𝑃𝑊99log (𝑃𝑊99𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) 
(21) 
The marginal propensity to consume social goods is different for male and female 
workers. The governments’ social expenditures (𝐺𝑡
𝐻) is part of the wage bill in H and can i) 
increase households’ social expenditures by  providing wage income in the social sector, ii) 
decrease households’ social expenditures by reducing the need for these expenditures. We 
assume that the demand for 𝐶𝑡
𝐻  is provided by the private sector in the market economy as 
part of the output in N, as mentioned above. 
Finally, households’ social expenditures and other consumption are interdependent 
decisions and will be analysed as part of a system in the empirical analysis, as discussed in 
the next section.  
An alternative specification, where relative prices in N and H also affect household 
consumption in H and N is not presented, as empirical analysis shows that price elasticities 
are insignificant. This is possibly a result of the composition of the two sectors in our case. 
Demand for H is likely to be very inelastic and it is also a very small part of total household 
spending (4.5% in 1985 when records start and 3.6% in 2017). Consumption in N constitutes 
the vast majority of spending and thereby aggregate price deflator is dominated by prices in 
H. The systems estimation methodology is expected to capture any potential common shocks, 
which the dependent variables do not account for, via the correlation of the errors between 
the two decisions. Finally, as prices depend on unit labour costs, the effects of the wage 
income and its ratio to the profit income (and hence to total income), capture the price effects 
of higher wages as well. The exclusion of the insignificant explicit price elasticities in the 
model also helps to reduce the complexity in the analytical solution of the model. 
We model private investment as a behavioural function of the share of profits in national 
income (reflecting expected profitability and availability of internal funds), GDP (capturing 
demand effects), private net wealth of different groups, and public debt to GDP ratio, which 
in turn affects the interest rate. An important novelty of this proposal is that profitability is 
affected by not only wage costs, but also changes in productivity in the medium-run, 
integrating the interaction between the demand and supply sides, as we discuss in more detail 
below. Both public spending in physical infrastructure such as transport or information and 
communication technology, or spending in education and health, are widely expected to 
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affect productivity. The model thereby integrates dual and conflicting effects of government 
spending on investment via a potentially negative crowding out effect, if higher public 
borrowing leads to higher interest rate; and a potentially positive crowding in effect in the 
medium-run, if profitability increases due to higher productivity. Another novelty is to 
account for the impact of wealth concentration on investment. Hence, private investment (𝐼𝑡) 
is  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑡 = 𝑖0 + 𝑖1 log 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑖2𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝜋𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)] + 𝑖3 log (
𝐷
𝑌
)
𝑡
+ 𝑖4log (𝑃𝑊1𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) + 𝑖5log (𝑃𝑊99𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) 
(22) 
where 𝐷 is the public debt. The private investment is expected to increase as a result of 
higher aggregate output (𝑖1 > 0).  𝜋𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅) is the after tax share of disposable profits in the 
N sector. Following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Blecker (1989), we expect the profit 
share to have a positive direct impact on private investment (𝑖2 > 0; e.g. You and Dutt, 1996; 
Hein and Vogel, 2008; Stockhammer et al., 2009; Seguino, 2012; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; 
Onaran and Obst, 2016).5 We assume that firms consider after-tax profits in making 
investment decisions as widely assumed in the literature (e.g. You and Dutt, 1996; Blecker, 
2002; Seguino, 2012). We use the ratio of public debt to GDP, (𝐷/𝑌)𝑡, to consider the 
possible negative crowding out effects of rising public debt on the interest rate and, thereby, 
private investment (𝑖3 < 0). Finally, we incorporate the net household wealth (private assets-
debt) of different groups, 𝑃𝑊1 and𝑃𝑊99. Rising wealth and/or asset prices is expected to 
lower the cost of finance, which in turn is expected to have a positive effect on investment 
(Stockhammer et al., 2018). If an increase in assets, in particular financial assets, lead to 
improved access to credit as well as more optimistic business expectations about future 
profitability, a rise in net wealth is expected to increase private investment (𝑖4 and 𝑖5 > 0). 
However, if a higher private net wealth implies higher business liabilities, or if firms react 
more strongly to liabilities than assets (even if assets are increasing faster than liabilities), 
private net wealth could have a negative effect on investment (Stockhammer et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, 𝑃𝑊99 and 𝑃𝑊1 can also have different effects. 𝑃𝑊99 can have positive 
effects in particular on residential investment. Recent firm level evidence on financialization 
suggests that the share of financial assets in total assets of the non-financial companies has 
 
5 Alternatively, investment can be modeled as a function of the profit rate (e.g. Rowthorn, 1981; Dutt, 1984; 
Taylor, 1985; van Treeck, 2009; Carvalho and Rezai, 2016; Tavani and Zamparelli, 2017a).   However, Blecker 
(2002) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) argue that the inclusion of the profit rate instead of the profit share in 
the investment function would increase the possibility of obtaining a wage-led demand regime, because the 
profit rate can be decomposed into capacity utilisation and the profit share, and the inclusion of both variables 
would double count the impact of capacity utilisation on investment.   
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increased substantially in the past decades, and the effect of non-operating income originating 
from financial assets crowds out the physical investment of the large non-financial 
companies, while it has a positive effect on the investment of the relatively cash constrained 
smaller companies (Tori and Onaran, 2018, 2019; Orhangazi, 2008; Demir, 2009). This 
evidence would suggest that the effect of 𝑃𝑊99, which includes ownership of small and 
medium enterprises, is expected to be positive ( 𝑖5 > 0), while the effect of 𝑃𝑊1 is expected 
to be negative as firms direct their activities to financial accumulation as opposed to their 
core businesses (𝑖4 < 0)
 6. Furthermore, the increase in 𝑃𝑊1 might go along with increasing 
market concentration in different sectors. This would also create an impediment on private 
investment, since high market concentration would increase the barriers to entry and reduce 
firms’ incentives to invest and innovate (IMF, 2019; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016). 
 The public debt at time t (𝐷𝑡) is the public debt accumulated from the public debt in 
the previous period (𝐷𝑡−1) with an interest rate of 𝑟𝑡−1, plus the total government 
expenditures at t, minus the taxes collected from profits, wages, wealth and consumption at 
time t.   
 
𝐷𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐶 + 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 +𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊𝑃𝑊𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡
𝐶(𝐶𝑡
𝑁 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐻) 
(23) 
𝐷𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) 𝐷𝑡−1 +
𝑌𝑡
𝑁(𝜅𝑡
𝐻 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐶 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐺)
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹)𝑡𝑡
𝑊
− 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 + 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 )𝑡𝑡
𝑊 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑌𝑡
𝑁 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀))
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊𝑃𝑊𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡
𝐶(𝐶𝑡
𝑁 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐻) 
(24) 
where 𝑡𝑡
𝐶  is the ITR on consumption, and 𝑟𝑡 is the interest rate on public debt. 
Exports are modelled as a function of prices of exports relative to foreign prices and 
foreign income (𝑌𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑) and the exchange rate (𝜀); imports are a function of demand in N and 
domestic prices relative to import prices. For simplicity we assume that marginal propensity 
to import in H is zero. Imports depend on domestic prices relative to import prices, the 
exchange rate and aggregate demand in 𝑌𝑁.  Appendix 2 shows the links between domestic 
and import prices, nominal unit labour cost, real unit labour cost, which is the wage share, 
and thereby presents the effect of the profit share on exports and imports via the pass through 
from wage share to nominal unit labour costs and prices and the price elasticity of exports 
 
6 Based on empirical evidence, Lysandrou (2011) shows that wealth distribution and hence individuals at the top 
of wealth distribution are the main drivers of the demand for toxic assets in the US before the 2008 Economic 
Crisis.   
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and imports. Hence, to simplify the model, in reduced form, exports and imports can be 
written as 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡 = 𝑥0 + 𝑥1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 + 𝑥2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡 + 𝑥3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜀𝑡 (25) 
                     𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑛2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡 + 𝑛3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜀𝑡    (26) 
Labour productivity is constant in the short run and changes endogenously in the medium-
run in the rest of the economy, as we assume technological change or adoption of new 
techniques take time. We assume productivity in the social sector is constant, and simply 
equal to output per hour of employment in both the short and the medium-run.7  Labour 
productivity in the N sector (𝑇𝑡
𝑁) is  
 
log 𝑇𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑡0 + 𝑡1 log
(𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑁𝑡−1
+ 𝑡2 log
𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺
𝑁𝑡−1
+ 𝑡3 log 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑡4 log𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑡5 log(𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 ) + 𝑡6 log
𝑈𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
 
(27) 
In the medium-run, the labour productivity is likely to be positively affected by lagged 
values of social infrastructure investment provided by the government as well as households’ 
consumption expenditures in marketized social services (𝐶𝐻),  and physical public 
investment (𝑡1, 𝑡2 > 0). We also expect domestic unpaid care labour to affect labour 
productivity positively (𝑡6 > 0). Substituting equation (17) for unpaid care labour, we are 
able to model the effect indirectly via the effect of public and private spending in H.8 We 
expect the effects of these to be realised over a longer time period, namely in the next period. 
Higher output would also lead to higher labour productivity due to Verdoorn effect 
(Naastepad, 2006; Hein and Tarassow, 2010), as greater scale can lead to more efficient 
allocation of sources (𝑡3 > 0). Moreover, following Marx (1867) and later the theoretical 
contributions and empirical findings of Naastepad (2006), Taylor (2004) and Hein and 
Tarassow (2010), we expect that higher female and male wages in N increases the firm’s 
preference for labour-saving technologies, which in turn increases labour productivity (𝑡4,
𝑡5 > 0). This is also consistent with the new Keynesian efficiency wage theories (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984).  Higher output and higher wages also have a lagged effect, since the 
change in technology and/or techniques pushed by these factors would require time. This is 
 
7 Output in H is simply equal to the wage bill in H, as there is no profit in H. Productivity in H is 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 +
𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻) as defined in Equation 14. Increasing productivity in H is less related to the availability of 
technology or better skills, as the quality of these services is more important and is in many cases requires more 
hours of nurses, care workers, teachers per patient or student.  
8 This simplification is also imposed by the unavailability of time series data for unpaid care labour at the stage 
of empirical analysis. 
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also consistent with Hein and Tarassow (2010) who estimate lagged positive effects of wages 
and output on labour productivity.  The next period is a sufficiently long time period for these 
effects to be realised, e.g. five years or more;9 furthermore the time required for these 
different factors to affect productivity is an empirical question, e.g. the impact of public 
investment in childcare may take longer than the impact of other types of government 
spending or higher wages. In the theoretical model, we abstract from differences in the lag 
structure of the effects, and represent the long-time period with a single lagged effect. Using 
(17) and (27) we can further simplify productivity as in (27’), for the purposes of the 
analytical solution in the next section   
 
log 𝑇𝑡
𝑁 = ℎ0 + ℎ1 log (
𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑁𝑡−1
) + ℎ2 log (
𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺
𝑁𝑡−1
)
+ ℎ3 log 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁 + ℎ4 log𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + ℎ5 log 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁  
(27’) 
where ℎ0 = 𝑡0 + 𝑔0𝑡6 and ℎ1 = 𝑡1 + 𝑔𝐺𝑡6. 
Unpaid domestic care labour, 𝑈, is shared between women (𝑈𝑡
𝐹) and men (𝑈𝑡
𝑀), where 𝛽𝑑  
is the share of 𝑈𝑡
𝐹 in 𝑈, and is exogenously determined by social norms:    
 𝑈𝑡
𝐹  =  𝛽𝑑𝑈𝑡 (28) 
 𝑈𝑡
𝑀  =  (1 − 𝛽𝑑 )𝑈𝑡 (29) 
In case of extreme gender inequality 𝛽𝑑 = 1.  
Female and male labour force participation rates (labour force as a ratio to population, 
𝑁𝑡
𝐹and 𝑁𝑡
𝑀) are positive functions of average wages, benefits and social infrastructure and 
negative functions of Ut. Hence female and male labour force is 
 𝐿𝑡
𝐹 = (𝑙1𝐹(𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝑁) + 𝑙2𝐹(𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑙3𝐹𝑈𝑡
𝐹)𝑁𝑡
𝐹  (30) 
 𝐿𝑡
𝑀 = (𝑙1𝑀(𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝐻 + 𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝑁) + 𝑙2𝑀(𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑙3𝑀𝑈𝑡
𝑀)𝑁𝑡
𝑀 (31) 
For simplicity we consider benefits as part of 𝐺𝑡
𝐻. 
   If employment grows faster than the labour force for a particular type of worker, 
unemployment rate will decrease, and vice versa. If demand for employment, E, for a 
particular type of worker is not met by an increase in labour supply due to constraints in 
supply, e.g. a low female labour supply due to lack of provision of public social infrastructure 
for care, either there will be an exogenous increase in labour supply due to migration, or 
gender norms, and occupational segregation coefficients will change or wages will adjust.  
 
9 In Section 5 in the empirical analysis, we take the five year sum (non-overlapping  average of explanatory 
variables  starting from 1970 and of the dependent variable starting from 1971) of the explanatory variables , 
which is a proxy for the human capital stock. Investment in the sector is also added in the panel data analysis, 
whereas in the aggregate theoretical model here, it is part of aggregate output. 
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Changes in population via increased migration, to relax labour supply constraints in the 
care economy due to rising need for care work along with rising female employment is not 
analysed in this model, and is assumed to be exogenous. Similarly, to simplify the model we 
also do not model the impact of social infrastructure and unpaid care on fertility or mortality 
rates.  Both are potential extensions for future research.  
While in our model for simplicity we ignore the feedback effects of changes in labour 
supply and consequently unemployment on wages, it is realistic to assume that, in the long-
run, changes in labour demand vs. labour supply can lead to changes in wages, however to 
simplify the model wages are set exogenously based on bargaining power, institutions and 
social norms.  
Similarly, a rise in wages in a particular sector, e.g. H as an outcome of higher public 
social infrastructure, or a faster increase in wages in the social sector compared to wages in 
the rest of the economy is likely to lead to higher labour supply of both men and women. This 
would lead to also changes in the sectoral segregation ratios in the social sector and the rest 
of the economy, as well as a change in social gendered norms and the distribution of unpaid 
domestic labour. While these are interesting extensions, they are outside the scope of this 
paper, where our primary aim is to analyse the impact of exogenous changes in wages and 
gender pay gap on employment of women and men and fiscal policies. 
Finally, net wealth will change with changes in income and net saving propensity of 
different income groups.    
 
log(𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) =  𝑎0 + 𝑎𝐹 log(𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)) + 𝑎𝑀 log(𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀(1 −
𝑡𝑡
𝑊)) + 𝑎𝑅 log(𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)) + 𝑎𝑐 log(𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊))  (32) 
We model the wealth concentration, i.e. PW1/PW (𝜆𝑡) as a function of functional income 
distribution (after tax profit share), gender wage gap, wealth tax, and lagged value of wealth   
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜆𝑡) =  𝑠0 + 𝑠1 log[𝜋𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)] + 𝑠2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊) + 𝑠3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝛼𝑡
𝑁)
+ 𝑠4𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝛼𝑡
𝐻) + 𝑠5𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜆𝑡−1)  
(33) 
The effect of the profit share captures the effect of the different marginal propensity to 
save from profit vs. wage income as well as the scale and type effects due to differences in 
the assets and liabilities of households earning predominantly capital vs. labour income 
(Gabaix et al. 2016;  Benhabib et al., 2011, 2019; Piketty, 2014, 2015; Fagereng et al. 2016; 
Kaplan et al., 2018). The effects of gender pay gaps capture such differences between male 
and female workers. Tax on wealth is expected to affect wealth concentration if it has a 
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progressive nature. Finally, wealth concentration is expected to have a strong path 
dependency, and be significantly correlated to its past values.10 
The net wealth of top 1% (𝑃𝑊1𝑡) and bottom 99% (𝑃𝑊99𝑡) are given by 
 log(𝑃𝑊1𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) = log(𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) +  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜆𝑡) (34) 
 log(𝑃𝑊99𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) = log(𝑃𝑊𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) +  𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝜆𝑡) (35) 
3. The impact of labour market policies affecting wages and the gender pay gap 
3.1 The effects of a change in female and male wages in N   
We first analyse the impact of rising female and male wages in N in the short-run with a 
constant ratio between male and female wages (𝛼𝑁).11 A change in wage rates, affects the 
share of wages (and profits) in national income, which in turn effects wealth concentration.  
Following Bowles and Boyer (1995), we classify the regimes in which rising wages (rather 
than wage shares as in Bhaduri and Marglin (1990)) leads to an increase in aggregate output 
as wage-led, and we classify the regimes in which higher wages reduce aggregate output as 
profit-led. 
The effect of rising wages in N on aggregate output in the short-run (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 in Appendix 3) is 
through the effects on consumption in N and H, private investment, exports, imports and the 
consequent multiplier effects (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). Details of the effects coming through each component 
of demand are shown in Appendix A3.1. We define a demand regime as wage-led in the 
short-run if the impact of a simultaneous increase in female and male wages in N on 
aggregate demand is positive (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 > 0) and as profit-led in the short-run if the impact is 
negative (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 < 0). 12 
For constant total output, a rise in female and male wages in N does not have a partial 
impact on female and male employment in N and H, since an increase in labour productivity 
through switching to labour saving technologies takes place only with a lag. Hence, the total 
impact on female and male employment in N and H is only due to the change in total output. 
 
10 Public borrowing (debt/GDP) could have an effect on wealth and its concentration but as the empirical 
estimations for the UK did not indicate significant effects, we did not include it in the theoretical model for 
simplicity. Similarly, asset prices are not included as exogenous variables in modeling wealth in order to focus 
on the interaction of wealth and income distribution in the model. 
11 We abstract from changes in inter-sectoral labour supply in response to changes in wages in N with constant 
wages in H. In Section 5, we combine this static analysis with the case when wages increase both in N and H at 
the same rate, which is a more realistic scenario. 
12 While the definition of short-run demand regimes are comparable to the previous literature based on Bhaduri 
and Marglin (1990), the medium-run effects combine both demand and supply-side effects, and therefore refers 
to the properties of the economy rather than just the demand regime. 
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Moreover, for constant output, an increase female and male wages in N squeezes the profit 
share (|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
< 0) as the partial impact on employment in N is zero.  
An increase in female and male wages in N has a partial impact on consumption in N and 
H through changing distribution of income and the impact of this on wealth in the short-run. 
For constant income, we expect rising wages in N to have a positive partial impact on the 
total consumption (in N and H) in the short-run through declining profit share, as the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is expected to be larger than that out of 
profit income, based on empirical estimations (see Hein and Vogel, 2008; Onaran and 
Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Obst et al., 2019 for the UK). Higher wages in N are 
expected to reduce the wealth share of the top 1% while increasing total wealth, which 
together affect the consumption in N and H through 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99.   
Female and male wages in N have a partial negative impact on private investments 
through squeezing profit share in the short-run. Higher wages in N also affect private 
investment through their effects on 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99. Furthermore they have a modest short-
run partial effect on public debt/GDP if the tax rates on labour and capital income aren’t the 
same, because the change in income distribution affects tax revenues from labour and capital 
income.  
Finally, higher female and male wages in N lead to rising unit labour costs (falling profit 
share), and have a partial negative on exports and a positive impact imports in the short-run.  
In the next period, a rise in female and male wages in N affect labour productivity, and has 
further effects on aggregate output through changes in consumption in N and H, private 
investment, export, imports, government expenditures and the consequent multiplier effects 
(
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). .  
Figure 2 summarizes these channels. As discussed above, we expect higher wages in N to 
increase labour productivity. The rest of the effects are via changes in aggregate output in the 
short-run. If demand is wage-led in the short-run, higher wages in N also leads to higher 
labour productivity in the next period through higher aggregate output due to the Verdoorn 
effects. Moreover, we expect higher output to have further positive impact on the medium-
term productivity through increasing consumption in H, public social expenditures and other 
public expenditures. The effects via aggregate output are the opposite if demand is profit-led 
in the short-run. 
Figure 2 here 
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For a constant aggregate output, female and male wages in N have a negative partial 
medium-run effect on female and male employment in N if their influence on the labour 
productivity is positive, since higher labour productivity is expected to reduce the demand for 
labour for a constant output. Under these conditions, the medium-run partial effect of higher 
female and male wages in N on the profit share is also positive due to declining wage costs. 
Nevertheless, higher female and male wages in N could also have a negative partial medium-
run impact on the labour productivity and profit share if demand is profit-led in the short-run 
and the effects via aggregate output are sufficiently large. 
The medium-run partial impact of female and male wages in N on consumption in N and 
H will be via changes in wage income, profits and 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99. Nevertheless, the effect 
of higher female and male wages in N is ambiguous due to the ambiguity of its medium-run 
effect on the profit share. The medium-run partial impact of female and male wages in N on 
private investment is via the effect on the profit share, public debt/GDP and 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99. 
If demand is wage-led in the short-run, the medium-run effect of wages in N is also more 
likely to be positive as its effects through the profit share, public debt/GDP and wealth are 
more likely to be positive. 
For a constant aggregate output, the medium-run effect of female and male wages in N on 
trade depends on the medium-run effect on labour productivity. If the impact of labour 
productivity is positive, higher female and male wages in N have a positive partial impact on 
exports and a negative effect on imports in the medium-run. 
Table 1 summarises different regimes and their conditions. In the short-run, an increase in 
female wages in N with a constant gender wage gap is likely to have a positive partial effect 
on consumption in N and H and a negative partial effect on private investment and net 
exports. Therefore, the size of the effect on consumption relative to private investment and 
net exports determines whether the regime is profit-led or wage-led. If the sum of effects in 
the short-run and the next period is positive ((Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 +Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 ) > 0), we define this regime as 
wage-led in the medium-run. If the total effect is negative ((Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 +Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 ) < 0), we define 
this regime as profit-led in the medium-run.  
Table 1 here 
As the impact of wages in N on labour productivity and the profit share in the next period 
is ambiguous, we cannot predict their effect on each component of aggregate output in the 
next period and the likely conditions that would make an economy wage-led or profit-led in 
the medium-run without knowing the size of the effects on productivity. Theoretically, an 
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economy that is profit-led in the short-run could be wage-led in the medium-run, if the 
increase in wages has a sufficiently large positive effect on labour productivity in the next 
period, because increasing labour productivity could offset the squeeze on the profit share. 
Similarly, an economy that is wage-led in the short-run could theoretically be profit-led in the 
medium-run, if higher wages lead to a significant shift to labour-saving techniques, which 
would substantially reduce employment and hence labour income. Nevertheless, if an 
economy is wage-led (profit-led) in the short-run, it is likely that the economy will be wage-
led (profit-led) in the medium-run too. 
Finally, Figure 3 summaries the impact of a simultaneous increase in female and male 
wages in N on employment. A simultaneous increase in female and male wages in N 
increases female and male employment in N and H in the short-run, if the economy is wage-
led in the short-run. Similarly, in the next period changes in aggregate output affects 
employment, depending on whether output increases or decreases. Nevertheless, a 
simultaneous increase in female and male wages also affects employment in N in the next 
period via an increase in labour productivity. Therefore, an economy that is wage-led in the 
medium-run could also experience a decline in both female and male total employment along 
with higher female and male wages in N. 
Figure 3 here 
3.2 The effects of a change in the gender wage gap in N  
 In this section, we analyse the effects of closing the gender wage gap in N through a rise 
in female wages in the rest of the economy. This can be achieved via an upwards 
convergence, i.e. female wages increasing faster than male wages or downward convergence, 
i.e. female wages decreasing slower than male wages, or with only female wages increasing. 
In this section, we focus on the latter case where the male wages in N are constant (𝑤𝑁𝑀 =
𝑤𝑁𝑀
∗
) and only female wages in N increase. We analyse the effects of the former case in 
section 5 empirically by combining the analysis in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
The short-run effect of closing the gender wage gap in N on aggregate output (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝛼) also 
depends on its effects on consumption in N and H, private investment, export, imports and 
the multiplier (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). Details of these effects are in Appendix A3.2. We define a demand 
regime, in which a rise in only female wages with closing the gender gap in N leads to a 
higher aggregate output in the short-run (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝛼 > 0) as female wage-led or gender equality-
led in the short-run. If a rise in female wages with closing the gender gap in N leads to lower 
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aggregate output in the short-run (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝛼 < 0), the demand regime is defined as gender 
inequality-led in the short-run. 
For a constant aggregate output, the partial effects of a rise in female wages in N on 
employment are zero in the short-run. The short-run partial effect on the profit share is 
expected to be negative (|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
 𝑌𝑡
< 0) although the magnitude of this effect is expected to 
be smaller compared to the short-run partial effect of a simultaneous increase in both female 
and male wages in N on the profit share.  
For a constant aggregate output, the signs of the short-run partial effects on consumption 
in N (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
) and consumption in H (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
) depend on the marginal propensity to 
consume in N and H out of female wage income relative to capital income and also the 
effects through the changes in 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99. A higher positive effect on consumption in 
H  (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
) is more likely than on consumption in N (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
), because women tend to 
devote a larger share of their income on social expenditures like education and healthcare 
compared to men as shown in numerous studies (Phipps and Burton, 1998; Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1996; Morrison et al., 2007). 
For a constant aggregate output, the effect of closing the gender wage gap in N in the 
short-run on investment (|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
) depends on changes in the profit share, public debt/GDP 
(D/Y), 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99. Again, the magnitude of this effect is expected to be smaller than the 
partial effect of a simultaneous increase in female and male wages, since it reduces the profit 
share less, which in turn is expected to affect D/Y and wealth less. For a constant aggregate 
output, closing the gender wage gap in N reduces exports and increases imports; however, the 
magnitude of the effect on both is smaller than the effects of a simultaneous increase in 
female and male wages in N. 
Table 2 summarises the alternative demand regimes in the short-run. An economy could 
be wage-led and female wage-led/gender equality-led or profit-led and gender inequality-led 
in the short-run. We define the former as equality-led demand regime and the latter as 
inequality-led regime. However, an economy could also be wage-led and gender inequality-
led or profit-led and female wage-led/gender equality-led in the short-run at the same time 
depending on the marginal propensities to consume out of female and male wage income and 
capital income. 
 Table 2 here 
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 The effect of closing the gender wage gap in N in the next period is mainly through its 
influence on labour productivity in N. The effects are very similar to those that were depicted 
in Figure 2 except that the shock is through only rising female wages in N. The direct impact 
of female wages in N on labour productivity through labour-saving technologies is smaller 
compared to the case of a simultaneous rise in both female and male wages in N. If the 
economy is female wage-led/gender equality-led in the short-run, closing the gender wage 
gap in N increases labour productivity in the next period as its effects through aggregate 
output and consumption in H and government expenditures are also expected to be positive. 
However, theoretically, the gender wage gap in N could also reduce labour productivity in the 
next period if the economy is gender inequality-led in the short-run. 
The medium-run partial effects of rising female wages in N on female and male 
employment in N (|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
, |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
) are negative, if the effect of wages on labour 
productivity in N is positive. In this case female wages in N also have a positive partial effect 
on the profit share in the next period (|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡
> 0). 
The medium-run partial effects of closing the gender wage gap in N on the components of 
demand depend on the same channels as in the effects of simultaneous increases in female 
and male wages in N except for the differences in the magnitudes. If closing the gender wage 
gap in N leads to higher labour productivity, then the partial effect on consumption in N 
(|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
) and H (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
) in the next period is negative. The rest of the effects on 
consumption in N and H are through the medium-run effects on 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99.   
The medium-run partial effects of closing the gender wage gap in N on private investment 
(|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
) depend on the changes in the profit share, public debt/GDP, 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99. The 
partial effects on the profit share are positive or negative depending on whether higher female 
wages increase or decrease labour productivity in the next period. Similarly, the medium-run 
partial effects on export and imports depend on productivity effects.  
We define an economy in which the sum of the short-run and medium-run impact of an 
increase in female wages in N on output is positive as female wage-led/gender equality-led in 
the medium-run ((Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝛼 +Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝛼) > 0). The case in which the sum of the short-run and 
medium-run impacts is negative is defined as gender inequality-led in the medium-run 
((Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝛼 +Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝛼) < 0). 
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Finally, the effects of closing the gender wage gap in N on employment are similar to the 
case depicted in Figure 3. If the economy is female wage-led/gender equality-led in the short-
run, closing the gender wage gap in N increases female and male employment in the short-
run. The impact of closing the gender wage gap in N in the next period affects the female and 
male employment via changes in labour productivity and aggregate output in the medium-run 
and could lead to a fall in female and/or male employment in the medium-run even if the 
economy is wage-led in the medium-run. 
4. The effects of fiscal policy 
4.1 The effects of an increase in public social infrastructure investment by increasing 
employment in H 
In this section, we analyse the case where social expenditure as a share of GDP (𝑡
𝐻) 
increases solely through the new public sector employment in the social sector with constant 
wages in this sector. In the UK, the share of female employment in the social sector (H) is 
significantly larger than the share of female employment in the rest of the economy (N). 
Therefore, we expect that with this policy larger employment for female workers would be 
generated in the short-run in the public social sector. 
The short-run effect of higher public social infrastructure investment as a share of GDP on 
aggregate output depends on the effects on consumption in N and H, private investment, 
public expenditures and the consequent multiplier effects as described in Appendix A4.1. An 
increase in the public social infrastructure investment affects female and male employment in 
N and profit share only through the multiplier effects of changes in aggregate output in the 
short-run; i.e. the partial effects are zero (|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0)13. The short-
run effects are summarised in Figure 4. 
  Figure 4 here 
An increase in public social infrastructure investment has a direct positive effect on 
aggregate output in the short-run. Moreover, the generation of new employment in the public 
social sector is also expected to stimulate consumption in N and H in the short-run. The wage 
payments in the public social sector also have a positive partial impact on both 𝑃𝑊1 and 99 
(|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
> 0, |
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
> 0), which also increases consumption in N and H.  
 
13 For a constant aggregate output, higher public social infrastructure investment does not affect the profit share 
and thereby employment.    
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For a constant aggregate output in N, higher public social infrastructure investment has a 
positive impact on private investment in the short-run through rising total aggregate output. 
The possible positive effects on 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99 also affect private investment in the short-
run; the effect of 𝑃𝑊1, in particular, is ambiguous as discussed in Section 2. However, an 
increase in public social infrastructure investment may partially crowd out private investment 
due to an increase in public debt/GDP in the short-run, if this leads to an increase in interest 
rates and if the investment is sensitive to interest rates.  
Next, we analyse the effect of an increase in public social infrastructure investment on 
labour productivity in the next period as summarised in Figure 5. We expect higher public 
social infrastructure investment to increase labour productivity in the next period. Moreover, 
higher public social infrastructure investment also affects labour productivity in the next 
period through changes in aggregate output depending on whether the effects on aggregate 
output are positive or negative in the short-run. If higher public social infrastructure 
investment stimulates aggregate output, it also leads to an increase in households’ social 
expenditures and public physical infrastructure investment in the short-run which may also 
increase the labour productivity in the next period. 
Figure 5 here 
An increase in the share of public social infrastructure in GDP has an effect on aggregate 
output in the next period through changes in labour productivity, public debt/GDP and wealth 
as summarized in Figure 6. For a constant aggregate output in N, the medium-run partial 
effect of public social infrastructure on female and male employment is negative and the 
effect on the profit share is positive if higher public social infrastructure increases labour 
productivity in the next period. This also affects consumption in N and H, private investment, 
exports and imports in the next period as discussed in Sections 3.1-2. The effects of a 
possible increase in public debt/GDP in the short-run effects are transmitted to 𝐷/𝑌 in the 
next period. This reduces private investment unless there is a sufficient increase in GDP and 
tax revenues to offset the increase in debt.  Finally, the short-run effects on wealth and 
medium-run effect on the labour productivity (hence employment and the profit share) also 
affect 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99 in the next period, which affects consumption in N and H and private 
investment in the next period. 
Figure 6 here 
We depict the overall effect of higher public social infrastructure on employment in Figure 
7. Higher public social infrastructure directly generates female and male employment in the 
27 
 
social sector in the short-run; however, it also is likely to generate further employment in the 
whole sector by increasing the GDP in the short-run. It is also expected to increase the labour 
productivity in the next period, which has a direct negative effect on the employment and 
might lead to a positive or negative effect through aggregate output in the next period.    
Figure 7 here 
Finally, we analyse the impact of higher public social infrastructure investment on public 
debt as a ratio to GDP. Higher public social infrastructure investment has an ambiguous 
effect on public debt/GDP in the short run as both debt and GDP increase. Higher public 
social infrastructure investment can lead to lower D/Y if the effect on GDP is sufficiently 
large. The rise in GDP increases both the denominator and tax revenues. 
4.2 The effects of an increase in public social infrastructure investment via a 
simultaneous increase in female and male wages in H   
In this section, we analyse the effect of an increase in public social infrastructure 
investment as a ratio to GDP due to an increase in female and male wages in H with a 
constant 𝛼𝐻 as opposed to directly increasing employment in H. The short-run effects of this 
change are very similar to the case where public social infrastructure expenditures increase 
via increasing employment in H with constant wages. Similar to Section 4.1, higher public 
social infrastructure expenditures due to an increase in female and male wages in H has a 
direct positive impact on aggregate output. Moreover, it affects the economy due to rising 
total wage payments in H, which in turn stimulates consumption in N and H, 𝑃𝑊1 and 
𝑃𝑊99, which have further effects on consumption in N and H and private investment. 
However, if the public debt/GDP increases, this leads to a negative effect on private 
investment. 
The channels in the medium-run are identical to the effects of an increase in public social 
expenditures due to higher employment in H. Higher female and male wages in H would 
increase labour productivity in the next period as described in Figure 5. It has a direct 
positive effect on labour productivity and also is likely to increase labour productivity due to 
Verdoorn effects and the increases in households’ social expenditure and other public 
expenditures stimulated by higher aggregate output in the short-run. Higher labour 
productivity may have either positive or negative effects on aggregate output in the next 
period due to the channels discussed in Sections 3.1-2 and 4.1.  
If public debt/GDP increases in the short-run, the public debt/GDP in the next period will 
be affected as well, and in turn will lead to a negative effect on private investments in the 
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next period. However, this effect might be alleviated or even reversed if greater female and 
male wages in H increase the aggregate output and tax revenues sufficiently. 
4.3 Effects of a change in the gender wage gap in H  
This section analyses the effect of an increase in public social expenditures by closing the 
gender wage gap in H by increasing female wages with a constant male wage. Figure 8 
describes the channels in which closing the gender wage gap in H affects aggregate output in 
the short-run. Compared to a simultaneous rise in female and male wages in H, the short-run 
effects on consumption in N and H are smaller for the same amount of increase in wages. 
However, the difference between the effects of these two changes on consumption is smaller 
than the difference between the effects of a simultaneous increase in female and male wages 
in N and closing the gender wage gap in N, since female workers constitute a larger part of 
employment in H.  
Figure 8 here 
The medium-run effects of closing the gender wage gap in H on labour productivity in the 
next period would be the same as in Figure 5 as discussed in Section 4.2. 
4.4 Effects of an increase in public physical infrastructure investment 
This section analyses the effects of a rise in public physical infrastructure investment as a 
share of GDP. In the short-run, higher public physical infrastructure investment has a direct 
positive effect on aggregate output. However, it also has a positive partial impact on public 
debt/GDP, which in turn leads to a negative partial effect on private investment (|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
< 0). 
The combination of the direct effect of public physical infrastructure investment and its 
influence through public debt/GDP along with their multiplier effects determines the sign of 
the effect of public physical infrastructure investment in the short-run as shown in Appendix 
A4.4.  
The medium-run effect of public physical infrastructure investment is determined by 
changes in labour productivity and public debt/GDP in the next period. As discussed in 
Section 5 below, we don’t find a positive direct effect of public physical infrastructure 
investment on labour productivity in the UK. However, public physical infrastructure 
investment can still affect labour productivity through changes in the aggregate output in the 
short-run. For a constant output, the medium-run effect of public physical infrastructure 
investment on public debt/GDP (|
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
) depends on the changes in public debt and tax 
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revenues. If public debt/GDP increases in the next period, this also will affect private 
investment negatively. 
4.5 The effects of taxes on wealth, profits and wages 
This section analyses the effects of an increase on tax rates on wealth, profit and wage 
income. The details of the effects are in Appendix 4.5.  
An increase in the tax rate on wealth leads to not only a decline in after-tax wealth, but 
also could reduce wealth concentration, i.e. the share of the top 1% in total wealth tax, if 
taxation on wealth has a progressive character. The changes in 𝑃𝑊1 and 𝑃𝑊99 have short-
run effects on consumption in N and H and private investment. Furthermore, an increase in 
the tax rate on wealth leads to a decrease in public debt, which has a positive effect on private 
investment in the short-run unless the decrease in the total wealth and consequently 
consumption leads to a substantial decrease in tax revenues. The short-run effects of wealth 
tax on aggregate output also affect labour productivity in the next period, which in turn affect 
aggregate output in the next period through the channels discussed in sections 3-4. An 
increase in the tax rate on wealth has further medium-run effects on total wealth, wealth 
concentration and public debt/GDP, which in turn affect aggregate output in the next period. 
 An increase in the tax rate on profit income has a negative short-run impact on total 
wealth (|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
< 0) and PW1  (|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
< 0), for a constant total output. However, its 
effect on PW99 is ambiguous as a lower wealth concentration has a positive effect on the 
wealth of the bottom 99%. The effects due to changes in PW1 along with tax rate on profit 
income have negative effects on consumption in N and H in the short-run. A higher tax rate 
on profit leads to a decline in the after-tax profit share and has a negative partial effect on 
investment in the short-run, for a constant aggregate output. However, it may also have a 
positive effect on private investment due to a decline in public debt/GDP, unless the decline 
in wealth and consumption leads to a substantial decline in tax revenues. The changes in PW1 
and PW99 also affect private investment (either positively or negatively) in the short-run. The 
increase in the tax rate on profit affects the aggregate output in the next period through its 
effects on labour productivity, total wealth, wealth concentration and public debt/GDP. 
 Finally, we analyse the impact of an increase in the tax rate on wage income. For a 
constant total output, this has a negative short-run impact on the total wealth (|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
< 0) 
and it also influences the wealth share of the top 1% in the short-run. The rise in the tax rate 
on wage income affects consumption in N and H in the short-run due to the negative effects 
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on the disposable incomes of workers as well as PW1 and PW99. The change in PW1 and 
PW99 also affect private investment in the short-run. Moreover, as in the case of other taxes, 
an increase in the tax rate on wage income may reduce public debt/GDP in the short-run 
which in turn may have a positive effect on private investment in the short-run, unless the 
decrease in wealth and consumption substantially reduces tax revenues. There are further 
effects on GDP in the next period due to changes in labour productivity, total wealth, wealth 
concentration and public debt/GDP. 
5. Data, estimation methodology and results 
The behavioural specifications are econometrically estimated using time series data for the 
UK. The definitions of all variables and data sources are in Appendix 1. The hourly wage and 
hours of work data are calculated based on data supplied by the EUKLEMS database for the 
period of 1970-2015. The national accounts time series data is based on the Annual Macro 
Economic database of the European Commission (AMECO) and the OECD for the period of 
1970-2016. The implicit tax rates are based on Eurostat data. The ratio of consumption in the 
social sector to total consumption is based on ONS (2016a) data. 
The data on wealth concentration for the share of the top 1% vs. the 99% in net private 
wealth is provided by the World Wealth and Income Database, which gathers information 
from national accounts, surveys, fiscal data and wealth rankings. We relied on data provided 
by Credit Suisse (2014-17) for the missing years in the former database. More detailed wealth 
data, which could allow distinction along with functional income categories or gender, based 
on household surveys for the UK (Wealth and Assets Survey) cover only a very short period 
of 4 waves during 2006-14, and therefore does not provide sufficient observations for 
macroeconomic analysis.  
The stylised facts of our data are presented in Appendix 5. Figure 1 above presents the 
variables related to gender inequality measured by the ratio of the hourly wage rate of 
men/women (α) and the share of women in hours worked (β) in the social sector (H) and the 
rest of the economy (N) in the UK. Despite an improvement in all measures since the early 
1980s, as of 2015 𝛼𝐻 and 𝛼𝑁 are still as high as 1.313 and 1.230 respectively (own 
calculations based on EUKLEMS data). The gender composition of employment has been 
relatively more stable, and the share of women in hours worked in N (𝛽𝑁)  is still as low as  
0.406 and women still constitute the vast majority of employment in H  (𝛽𝐻) with a ratio of 
0.752 in 2015 (own calculations based on EUKLEMS data).  
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Figure 9 shows the functional income distribution, i.e. the share of wages in national 
income (labour compensation/GDP at factor cost, adjusted for the labour compensation for 
each self-employed equivalent to the average compensation of the dependent employees) and 
wealth concentration (share of the top 1% in total net wealth, λ) in the UK. The share of 
wages in GDP fell from its peak of 0.706 to 0.584 in 1996 and despite a recovery since then, 
it is 4%-point below its peak at 0.665 as of 2016. Wealth concentration, measured by the 
share of the top 1% in total net wealth, has fallen from 0.283 in 1972 to 0.152 in 1984 and 
has risen sharply since then to 0.233 as of 2016. 
Figure 9 here 
There is no time series data dating back to 1970s for unpaid care work and its gender 
distribution; however, there is time use survey data for selected years. In 2014 women carried 
out 61.5% of all the hours of unpaid work at the household and 69.3% of the unpaid care 
work (in adult care and child care, laundry, cleaning and housework) in the UK (ONS, 
2016b). Hence, the gender composition of hours of unpaid care work is similar to the 
composition of paid care work.  
The productivity in N is estimated using panel data of 18 industries based on EUKLEMS 
for the period of 1970-201514. In order to reflect medium-term effects a non-overlapping five 
years average of explanatory variables starting from 1970 and of the dependent variable 
starting from 1971 are used to account for the lagged effects. Clustered standard errors are 
used. Different from equation (27’) for the aggregate economy, the sector’s own investment 
(Iit) is also included, as at the panel data level sectors value added (Yit) does not include 
sector’s Iit, while at the aggregate level YN includes private investment.15 The use of panel 
data helps to model the medium-run effects on productivity, which may not be easy to detect 
using time series due to the short time dimension of data. The integration of time series and 
panel data analysis to estimate the parameters of the structural behavioural specifications is a 
methodological novelty of the proposal.  
Households’ social and other consumption expenditures are estimated as interdependent 
decisions as part of a system using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). We estimate 
separate single equations for investment, exports, and imports. We choose the single equation 
 
14 The last year is determined by data availability. Electricity, gas and water; construction; public administration 
and defence, compulsory social security; agriculture, forestry and fishing and mining and quarrying (as well as 
education and health and social work) are excluded due to the difficulty in measuring productivity in these 
sectors. The results are rather robust to the inclusion of these sectors. The results are also robust to estimations 
excluding the post-2008 Great Recession period. 
15 As discussed in Section 2, the use 5-year sum (average) serves as a proxy for capital stock in terms of both 
private and public human and physical capital. 
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approach because it allows a clearer interpretation of the results. We also present two-stage 
least square estimations (and three-stage LS in the case of consumption) using instrumental 
variables (IV) to test robustness, where instruments are contemporaneous, first and second 
lagged values of hourly wage rates and employment shares of women and gender pay ratios 
in H and N, tax rates on labour and profit income and wealth (and the GDP of the rest of the 
world in the exports equation). Endogeneity issues could also be tackled by using a VAR 
method, however, this would require a large number of observations, and would make it 
difficult to individually specify each behavioural equation (Onaran and Obst, 2016). 
Unit root tests suggest that all our variables except for wealth concentration are integrated 
of order one.16 We first estimate error-correction models (ECM), except for wealth 
concentration. If no cointegration is found, the equations are estimated in differences.17 We 
start with general specifications with contemporaneous and lagged effects and arrive at the 
most parsimonious specification. In the case of wealth concentration, which is stationary, we 
estimate an ARDL (autoregressive distributed lag model). In the simulation analysis, we treat 
the coefficients as non-zero even when the p-value of the t-statistic is greater than 0.10; in 
these cases, the p-values are often around 0.2018. In order to test for autocorrelation, we use 
the Breusch-Godfrey test. We derive the long-run elasticities if ECM is significant. 
5.1. Estimation results 
SUR results for households’ social and other consumption expenditures (equations (21-
22)) are given in Table 3. Multiplying elasticities with consumption in the relevant category 
the relevant income category, we find that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) in N 
out of men’s wage income (0.73) is larger than the MPC out of women’s wage income (0.50), 
which in turn is larger than the MPC out of profit income (0.20). MPC in H is however 
highest out of women’s wage income (0.04), followed by MPC out of men’s wage income 
(0.02), and the MPC in H out of profit income is again the smallest (0.01). To our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical comparison of the marginal propensity to consume out of female and 
male wage income and profits. The results are consistent with other estimations showing that 
the marginal propensity to consume out of total wages are higher than that out of profits (see 
Onaran and Galanis, 2014 for a review) as well as micro-level evidence that the propensity to 
 
16 Results are available upon request.  
17 The t-ratios reported by Banerjee et al. (1998) are used for the speed of adjustment coefficient to test whether 
there is cointegration among the variables. 
18 We follow this methodology because in our simulations in Section 6, we do not prefer to treat our variables 
that have intuitively expected signs and are statistically insignificant (at 10%) as zero. The problems of 
dismissing the effects coming through variables that are statistically insignificant at commonly accepted levels 
are discussed in Ziliak and McCloskey (2004; 2008) in detail. 
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save is higher for female workers than male workers and women tend to devote a larger share 
of their incomes on social expenditures like education and healthcare compared to men 
(Seguino and Floro, 2013; Stotsky, 2006; Morrison et al, 2007). MPC out of the wealth of the 
bottom 99% is 0.03 and the MPC out of the wealth of the top 1% is 0.01 in N, while the MPC 
out of wealth of both groups in H is negative, which we treat as zero in our simulations, due 
to the perverse sign as well as the very low level of statistical significance. However, the 
explanatory power of the estimations for C in H is rather low. 
Table 3here 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for private investment based on equation (22). 
After-tax profit share has a significant positive effect, but there is no cointegration 
relationship between the profit share and private investment. Public debt as a ratio to GDP 
has a significant negative effect, which reflects some negative crowding out effects of public 
borrowing on private investment. There is a strong significant and co-integrated long-run 
effect of aggregate demand on private investment. In terms of wealth effects, while the net 
wealth of the 99% has a positive significant, albeit short term, effect on private investment, 
the net wealth of the top 1% is co-integrated with private investment and has a negative 
significant effect. While the former can be interpreted as positive effects of wealth related to 
the residential investment or business investment of small and medium enterprises, the latter 
can be interpreted as evidence of the effect of financialization and concentration. This is 
consistent with the firm level evidence that the rise in non-operating income originating from 
financial assets crowds out the physical investment of the large non-financial companies, 
although it has a positive effect on the investment of the relatively cash constrained, smaller 
companies (see Tori and Onaran, 2018 for the UK; Orhangazi, 2008 for the US and Tori and 
Onaran, 2019 for the EU15).  The results are also in line with Stockhammer et al. (2018) who 
find negative significant effect of the total wealth on private investment in the UK.  As a rise 
in the profit share leads to an increase in PW1 as we discuss below, the negative effect of 
PW1 on investment offsets part of the positive effect of the profit share on investment.    
Table 4 
Table 5 and Table 6 present the estimation results for exports and imports based on 
equations 25-26. The rest of the world’s GDP has a statistically significant positive impact on 
exports, and an increase in profit share also leads to higher international competitiveness, and 
thereby higher exports, although the p-value is not very high (0.29). The increase in the 
output in the rest of the economy leads to a significant increase in imports, and the two 
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variables are co-integrated. A higher profit share leads to lower imports, again reflecting the 
impact of higher international competitiveness. 
Tables 5-6 here 
The panel data estimation results for productivity in N based on equation (27’) are 
presented in Table 7. The value added and the hourly wage rates in the sector (as indicated by 
the female wage rate and the gender pay ratio) have a statistically significant positive effect 
on productivity. At the macro level, the sum of the per capita public and private spending in 
the social sector has a positive statistically significant effect on productivity in N. The high 
effect of public spending in education, childcare, health and social care on productivity in the 
rest of the economy provides supporting evidence that this spending serves the purpose of 
infrastructure investment. The effect of the sector’s own investment and government physical 
infrastructure investment are statistically highly insignificant and are treated as zero in the 
simulations, as the negative sign is rather perverse. 
Table 7 
Table 8 and Table 9 present the estimation results for total private net wealth and its 
concentration based on equations (32-33) respectively. An increase in the wage income of 
men and women and profit income lead to a rise in total wealth and there is also a strong 
lagged effect of past wealth. The concentration of wealth increases with increasing after-tax 
profit share19 and its own lagged value, and decreases with tax on wealth..Empirical 
estimations failed to indicate a statistically significant effect of the gender wage gap or the 
share of women in total wage income on wealth concentration. While gender wage gaps are 
expected to lead to gender differences in the net wealth of men and women wage earners, the 
share of the top 1% in net wealth seems to be related to functional income distribution, rather 
than gender wage gaps. However, any increase in female wages at a rate faster than male 
wages, which closes the gender pay gap, also decreases the profit share, and thereby affects 
wealth concentration. The results show how functional income inequality leads to wealth 
concentration, which also has a strong path dependency. Redistributive tax policies on capital 
income and wealth also decrease wealth concentration. 
Tables 8-9 
Appendix 6 presents the specifications in Tables 1-4 with the IV approach. While the 
results are very robust, in some cases the significance of the variables is lower in the IV 
estimations, which reflects the weakness of the instruments. In the next section, we will base 
 
19 The statistically insignificant lags of the profit share are kept in the specification due to the ARDL structure 
because of the existence of unit root in the profit share.  
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the simulation analysis for the impact of changes in wages, gender pay gaps or fiscal policies 
on the parameters estimated by the estimations in Tables 3-6. 
6. Policy analysis: effects of the labour market and fiscal policies   
In this section we use the empirically estimated parameters of the model to simulate the 
effects of changes in wages, gender pay gap, different types of public spending, and taxes on 
wages, profits and wealth. Changes in wages in turn affect functional income distribution 
between wage and profit income. Changes in the share of profit in national income (after-tax) 
as well as wealth tax affect wealth concentration. In each case, the simulations assume that 
the increase in the wage rate, public spending/GDP ratio or tax rates take place in the first 
period, and then the relevant variables (e.g. the wage rate) stay constant in the next period in 
order to compare the effects in the short and medium-run. 
Table 10 shows the total (post-multiplier) effects of changes in wages and gender pay gap 
on the components of aggregate demand, consumption in N and H, private investment, 
exports, imports, government investment in social and physical infrastructure and 
government current spending (all as a ratio to GDP), GDP, employment and public debt as a 
ratio to GDP. The details of the calculations are in Appendices 3-4.20 The medium-run (MR) 
is defined as the cumulative of the effects in the short-run (SR) and the next period when 
productivity in N changes endogenously.  
Table 10 here 
Scenario (A) presents the effects of a 1% increase in both female and male hourly (real) 
wage rate in N; scenario (B) presents the effects of a 1% increase in only female wages in N 
with constant male wages (1% decline in 𝛼𝑁); i.e. closing the gender pay gap in N by 1%. In 
both cases, all components of demand except exports increase both in the short and the 
medium-run. Exports decrease as an increase in wages in N lead to a decline in the profit 
share. The multiplier (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
) is 2.234. In scenario (A), GDP increases by 0.244% in the 
short-run and by 0.146% in the medium-run; hence the economy is wage-led, although the 
effect is economically small. The increase in GDP the medium-run in all scenarios is smaller 
as in the next period the increase in productivity in N leads to a decline in employment in N 
and therefore offsets some of the demand effects. In scenario (B), GDP increases by 0.062% 
in the short-run and by 0.027% in the medium-run; hence the economy is gender equality-led, 
but the effects are even smaller than in the case when both wages increase. Hours of 
 
20 Wherever required, the elasticities in the estimations in Tables 3-9 are converted to marginal effects using the 
averages of the relevant variables for the estimation period. 
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employment of both men and women increase in the short-run in both scenarios (A) and (B), 
but decrease in the medium-run (by 0.556% in (A) and 0.105% in (B)) as the productivity 
increase in N in the medium-run (0.812% in (A) and 0.153% in (B)) is stronger than the 
increase in GDP.  
Scenario (C) presents the effects of a 1% increase in both female and male wages in H21 
and scenario (D) presents the effects of a 1% increase in only female wages in H with 
constant male wages (1% decline in 𝛼𝐻); i.e. closing the gender pay gap in H by 1%. 
Demand increases again with both higher wages and gender equality both in the short and the 
medium-run. Compared to the effects of increasing wages in N, the total effects on GDP are 
higher for a variety of reasons: The increase in consumption in H is higher because a rise in 
wages in H have a more substantial effect on the female wage bill and the marginal 
propensity to consume in H out of the female wage income is higher compared to the male 
wage income. The increase in private investment is higher because a rise in wages in H does 
not squeeze private profits. For this reason, the rise in imports in the short run is smaller and 
exports do not fall in the short run and increase in the medium-run, as a rise in productivity in 
N by 0.433% increases the profit share. The multiplier ((
1
1−𝜑𝑘
) (
1
1−𝑡
𝐻)) is 2.245. In scenario 
(C) GDP increases by 0.427% in the short-run and by 0.333% in the medium-run, and in 
Scenario (D) GDP increases by 0.298% in the short-run and by 0.232% in the medium-run. In 
both scenarios, employment of women increases not only in the short-run but also in the 
medium-run albeit by a small amount (0.022% and 0.012% respectively), but the 
employment of men increase only in the short-run and decreases slightly in the medium-run 
due to strong productivity gains (by 0.071% and 0.054% respectively). 
Finally, scenario (E) presents the effects of a 1% increase in female and male wages in 
both N and H, which is the sum of the effects in scenarios (A) and (C),  and (F) presents and 
upward convergence scenario of closing the gender pay gaps with female wages increasing 
faster than male wages, i.e. a 2% increase in female wages and 1% increase in male wages in 
both N and H, which is the sum of the effects in simulations (A), (B), (C) and (D). An 
example of the latter scenario would be to increase average wages via an increase in the 
minimum wage or collective bargaining coverage while at the same time enforcing equal pay 
legislation and aiming at higher rates of increases in occupations at the bottom end of the pay 
 
21 The increase in hourly real wage rate in N and H in GBP is comparable. A 1% increase in female wages in H 
and N are £0.18 and £0.17 respectively, and a 1% increase in male wages in H and N are £0.24 and £0.21 
respectively in 2015.   
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scale, where women constitute a large share of the workforce. In the upward convergence 
scenario, GDP increases by 1.030% in the short-run and by 0.736% in the medium-run, but 
despite an increase in employment of both women and men in the short run, employment 
decreases in the medium-run for both (by 0.528% for women and 0.865% for men). Total 
employment, as well as employment of both men and women, are wage-led and gender 
equality-led in the short-run but not in the medium-run when wages increase in both sectors.   
Along with the increase in GDP, public debt as a ratio to GDP decreases in all scenarios, 
including in (C)-(F), all of which include a direct increase in public social infrastructure 
spending via higher wage rates in H; e.g. in (F) public debt/GDP decreases by 0.354%-points 
in the short-run and 0.327%-points in the medium-run. 
The results in scenario (A) are comparable to previous research, albeit based on the impact 
of the profit share on aggregate output only, which find that the UK is a wage-led economy 
(Bowles and Boyer, 1995; Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004; Naastepad and Storm, 2007; 
Hein and Vogel, 2008; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Obst et al., 2019; 
Jump and Mendieta-Muñoz, 2017; Oyvat et al., 2018). Based on our short-run results for the 
rise in the wage rate of both women and men in N, a 1%-point fall in the profit share leads to 
0.378% increase in GDP after the multiplier, which is comparable for the previous estimation 
results for the UK based on aggregate data. 
 Table 11 shows the total (post-multiplier) effects of fiscal policies. The details of the 
calculations are in Appendix 4. Scenario (A) presents the effects of a 1%-point increase in 
public social infrastructure investment as a ratio to GDP (𝜅𝐻), i.e. hours of employment in H 
(e.g. more teachers, nurses, social care workers) with a constant wage rate in H. Following 
Ilkkaracan (2013), who coined the term “purple” economy for public social infrastructure to 
chime with the green economy, we label this policy as purple public social infrastructure 
investment. Scenario (B) presents the effects of a 1%-point increase in public physical 
infrastructure investment/GDP (𝜅𝐺). To indicate the priority of investment in renewable 
energy, public transport, and housing insulation we label this investment as green public 
investment. In both cases, all components of demand increase, and the increase in the 
medium-run is slightly smaller due to the increase in productivity. Exports increase only in 
the medium-run due to the increase in the profit share. A 1%-point increase in public 
investment in social infrastructure increases productivity (output per hour) in the rest of the 
economy by 3.3% percent in the medium run.  The increase in productivity is substantially 
higher in the case of higher social infrastructure investment (3.272%) compared to the case of 
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higher physical infrastructure investment (0.510%). This is mostly due to the strong direct 
positive impact of social infrastructure on productivity as well as the higher rate of increase 
in household consumption in H, as more jobs are created for women in scenario (A) in H, 
which predominantly hires women. In the case of higher social infrastructure spending, GDP 
increases more (3.585% in the short-run and 2.707% in the medium-run) than the case of 
physical infrastructure investment (2.046% in the short-run and 1.999% in the medium-run) 
not only in the short-run but also the medium-run. The GDP and employment impact are 
substantially higher than the effects of increasing wages in Table 10. Despite productivity 
increases, employment increases not only in the short-run but also the medium-run for both 
men and women in both scenarios. However, the increase in women’s employment is much 
stronger compared to men in the case of social infrastructure investment due to occupational 
segregation and concentration of women in the social sector. Women’s employment increases 
by 6.722% in the short-run and 3.238% in the medium-run while men’s employment 
increases by 4.437% in the short-run and only 0.420% in the medium-run in (A), whereas in 
(B) employment of both men and women increase at a rather similar rate (2.210% for women 
and 2.109% for men in the short-run and 1.764% for women and 1.576% for men in the 
medium-run). Our short-run results are comparable to the input-output table based analysis in 
De Henau et al. (2016) for the UK suggesting that the positive impact of public social 
infrastructure investment on male employment is at least as high as the effect of public 
physical infrastructure investment; however when the increase in productivity in the medium-
run is included in our analysis, the effect on male employment in the former case is 
substantially smaller. The magnitudes of the effects are not comparable as De Henau et al. 
(2016) focus on only construction for physical infrastructure and childcare and social care for 
social infrastructure.   
Table 11 
In both scenarios, public debt/GDP decreases in the short-run (by 0.981%-point in (A) and 
0.213%-point in (B)) but increases marginally in the medium-run (by 0.497%-point in (A) 
and 0.550%-point in (B)). But even in the medium-run, increasing public spending funds 
about half of itself by generating higher output and tax revenues. It is also worth emphasizing 
that private investment increases overall, despite the partial negative effect of higher 
government borrowing thanks to the positive demand and productivity effects. 
Scenario (C), (D) and (E) in Table 11 present the effects of a 1%-point increase in the 
implicit tax rate on capital income, wealth and labour income respectively. Increasing taxes 
on both capital and labour income lead to a decline in all components of demand and overall 
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GDP, productivity in N as well as employment for both men and women in both the short and 
the medium-run. However, the negative effects on demand are much larger in the case of 
taxes on labour, even in the case of private investment, owing to a stronger negative effect on 
demand and productivity in N, and thereby public debt/GDP increases in the medium-run 
despite a rise in the tax rate. In contrast, a 1%-point increase in the implicit tax rate on wealth 
has positive and very large effects on both GDP and employment of men and women; 
however, we have to emphasize that a 1%-point increase in the implicit tax rate on wealth is 
almost doubling the current rate, which stands at 0.989% in 2016 taking it back to its peak in 
1970; hence an economically much more substantial increase than the 1%-point increase in 
the implicit tax rate on capital income. The most important effect of increasing wealth tax by 
1%-point is the fall in wealth concentration by 0.876%-point22, which in turn decreases 𝑃𝑊1 
and increases PW99 in both the short and the medium-run. Both of these developments lead 
to a significant increase in private investment due to the positive effects of the increase in 
PW99 and the decrease in 𝑃𝑊1 as well as higher consumption due to higher marginal 
propensity to consume in N out of 𝑃𝑊99.  As a consequence, GDP increases by 0.902% in 
the short-run and 4.285% in the medium-run; total employment increases by 0.949% in the 
short-run and 4.134% in the medium-run with comparable effects for both men and women. 
Public debt/GDP falls by 4.264%-point in the short-run and 10.268%-point in the medium-
run 
Finally, in Table 12 we present the impact of policy mixes. Scenario (A) shows the effects 
of a 1%-point increase in purple public social infrastructure investment/GDP and closing the 
gender gaps via upward convergence with a 2% increase in female wages and a 1% increase 
in male wages in both N and H. This sums up the effects in scenarios (A) in Table 11 and (F) 
in Table 10. GDP increases substantially in both the short-run (4.615%) and the medium-run 
(3.443%). Employment of women increases both in the short-run and the medium-run 
(7.835% and 2.710% respectively); however, employment of men increases only in the short-
run (5.500%) but decrease in the medium-run (0.445%) due to productivity gains in N, where 
most male employment is generated. Public debt/GDP decreases (by 1.543%-point in the 
short-run and 0.010%-point in the medium-run) when fiscal expansion takes the form of both 
hiring more people and paying them a higher hourly wage rate in H combined with increasing 
wages and gender equality in also the rest of the economy. 
Table 12 
 
22 The elasticity in the estimation in Table 9 is converted to this marginal effect using the averages of the 
variables for the estimation period. 
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Scenario (B) in Table 12 adds to (A) also a 1%-point increase in public green physical 
infrastructure investment/GDP (𝜅𝐺). Hence, scenario (B) is the case of purple and green 
public investment and upward convergence in wages, summing up the effects in scenarios 
(A) and (B) in Table 11 and (F) in Table 10. The effects on GDP are even stronger than in 
policy mix (A) and employment of both men and women increase both in the short (7.609% 
and 10.044%) and the medium-run (1.132% and 4.475%).  
To summarize, the effects of higher wages and gender equality on GDP are positive in 
both the short and the medium-run, albeit small; however, the effect of higher wages and 
gender equality on productivity is much stronger in the medium-run and therefore the impact 
on employment is negative. Hence, achieving both higher wages and gender equality and 
employment for both men and women requires a stimulus to demand in the form of higher 
public spending in both H and N. However, in this scenario, while public debt/GDP decreases 
in the short-run (1.756%-point), it increases marginally in the medium-run (0.540%-point).  
Scenario (C) in Table 12 presents a policy of progressive income taxation, i.e. increasing 
tax rates on capital income and decreasing tax rates on labour income by 1%-point, which is 
equivalent to the effects in simulations (C) minus (E) in Table 11. This leads to higher GDP, 
private investment and employment for both men and women and lower public debt/GDP in 
both the short and the medium-run. In the medium-run, GDP increases by 1.129%, women’s 
employment increases by 0.840%, men’s employment increases by 0.698% and public 
debt/GDP decreases by 0.531%-point. 
Finally, scenario (D) in Table 12 presents a policy mix of purple and green public 
investment,  upward convergence in wages, and progressive income and wealth taxation via a 
1%-point increase in public social and physical infrastructure investment/GDP (𝜅𝐻 and 𝜅𝐺) 
and closing the gender gaps via upward convergence in wages with a 2% increase in female 
wages and a 1% increase in male wages in both N and H, a 1%-point increase in the tax rate 
on profit income (𝑡𝑅),  a 1%-point decrease in the tax rate on wages (𝑡𝑊) and a 1%-point 
increase in the tax rate on wealth (𝑡𝑃𝑊), which is equivalent to the effects in simulations (A) 
plus (B) plus (C) plus (D) minus (E) in Table 11 plus  (F) in Table 10. In the medium-run, 
GDP increases by 10.856%, women’s employment increases by 9.607%, men’s employment 
increases by 5.836%, and public debt/GDP decreases by 10.259%-point. The results indicate 
that taxation of wealth is a particularly effective policy to fund purple and green public 
investment; e.g. inheritance tax may be a suitable tool for funding long term elderly care. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper develops a unified macroeconomic model to analyse the effects of changes in 
wages, gender pay gaps and wealth concentration and fiscal policies on output, employment 
of women and men, productivity and public debt/GDP.  
The results indicate that there is a significant interaction between functional income, 
gender and wealth equality. An increase in wages, including via closing gender pay gap with 
upward convergence leads to an increase in the wage share and functional income equality, 
which in turn decreases wealth concentration, which also has a strong path dependency. 
Redistributive tax policies on capital income and wealth also decrease wealth concentration. 
Similarly public spending affects inequalities as well by effecting employment and wage 
income. Furthermore, changes in inequalities have crucial effects on macroeconomic 
outcomes such as output, employment, productivity and budget balance. 
 We find that an upward convergence in wages, i.e. increasing wages with closing gender 
pay gap in both the social sector and the rest of the economy, leads to higher output in both 
the short and the medium-run. The UK is both wage-led and gender equality-led, and hence 
equality-led. However, the positive impact on productivity is stronger in the medium-run than 
on output, which leads to a fall in employment of both men and women.  
The positive impact of public social infrastructure investment on both output and 
employment is much higher, and despite a strong positive effect on productivity, employment 
of both men and women increases in the medium-run as well.  
The high effect of public spending in education, childcare, health and social care on 
productivity in the rest of the economy provide supporting evidence that this spending serves 
the purpose of infrastructure investment. Our analysis challenges conventional thinking about 
the categorization of public spending in health and social care, education and child care in 
national accounts. Day to day spending in these sectors, e.g. wages of teachers, nurses or 
social care workers, is considered as current spending, thus not as investment, in our national 
accounts; however public spending in these social sectors has long term benefits to the 
society as a whole, with substantial productivity impact in all other sectors of the economy by 
increasing the skills, health and innovative capacity of people. Crucially, they improve 
gender equality, and reverse one of the most persistent dimensions of inequality in our 
societies, as they provide crucial services which are otherwise provided by the unpaid 
invisible domestic labour of women. Public supply of these services helps women to 
participate in social and economic life more equally. This in turn further increases 
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productivity by unleashing the hidden potential of women. Moreover, in the current gendered 
occupationally segregated labour markets, these sectors employ predominantly women, and 
more social public spending helps closing the gender gap in employment.   
Recognizing the vast amount and importance of the time women spend on unpaid care 
at the household, which is not accounted for in the standard national accounts and measures 
such as GDP, is crucial for designing policies to increase gender equality. A fiscal policy 
stance, which aims to publicly provide the necessary social services, would radically decrease 
the amount of unpaid domestic care. E.g. universal free child care and nurseries open for 
sufficiently long hours benefit mothers and fathers by giving them an equal chance to balance 
work and life, and also benefit the society by decreasing inequality between children from 
different backgrounds, and improving the creative capacity of children.  Needless to say there 
will always be the need and desire for care provided by family members for children or the 
elderly in the domestic private sphere; regulations such as parental leave for both mothers and 
fathers, and working time arrangements that facilitate combining care and work for both men 
and women should ensure that time for caring can be equally shared between men and 
women.   
A policy mix of upward convergence in wages and public social infrastructure investment 
has a strong positive impact on output and women’s employment, but men’s employment 
decreases in the medium-run. Public debt/GDP also falls as an outcome of this policy mix.  
A policy mix of upward convergence in wages and public investment in both social and 
physical infrastructure leads to a higher increase in output and the employment of both men 
and women increase both in the short and the medium-run. To summarize, the effects of 
higher wages and gender equality on GDP are positive in both the short and the medium-run, 
albeit small; however, the effect of higher wages and gender equality on productivity is much 
stronger in the medium-run and therefore the impact on employment is negative. Hence, 
achieving both higher wages, gender equality and employment for both men and women 
requires a stimulus to demand in the form of higher public spending in both the social sector 
and the rest of the economy along with an upward convergence in wages. However, public 
debt/GDP increases marginally in the medium-run in this policy mix and an increase in tax 
rates is required to improve public debt/GDP.  
An increase in the progressivity of income taxation in the form of increasing the tax rate 
on capital income and decreasing the tax rate on labour income increases output, men’s and 
women’s employment, and decreases public debt/GDP in both the short and the medium-run.  
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An increase in the tax rate on wealth decreases wealth concentration and has a positive and 
the strongest impact on output, employment and the budget. 
Progressive taxation, which improves after tax equality in terms of income, wealth and 
gender, is also important in the context of public spending on non-means-tested services such 
as universal health and social care, education and child care. A higher tax rate on higher 
incomes is a way for those who can afford to contribute more towards universally provided 
public services. The results indicate that taxation of wealth is a particularly effective policy to 
fund purple and green public investment; e.g. inheritance tax may be a suitable tool for 
funding long term elderly care. 
In this paper, we analysed the effect of the various labour market and fiscal policies on 
hours of employment of women and men; however, we did not analyse the changes in 
working time regulations. Future research can analyse the effect of a further change in labour 
market regulation leading to a shortening of the working week, where a given number of 
hours of employment can be shared among a higher number of employees. A scenario of 
upward convergence in hourly wage rates along with a downward convergence in weekly 
working hours between men and women, i.e. men working shorter hours than the current 
circumstances, while more women increasing their hours of work, is expected to reduce both 
gender pay and employment gaps. Higher hourly wage rates may make a reduction in weekly 
working hours appealing for the current full-time employees, and the provision of high 
quality public social infrastructure may make higher hours of work appealing for the current 
part-time workers, who are predominantly women.  
There is also an important complementarity between gender equality, shorter working 
hours and green development (Onaran, 2016; İlkkaracan, 2013).  A larger proportion of the 
society’s time spent caring for each other is also a greener alternative, whether that is in paid 
or unpaid time, as these activities are much lower in terms of their carbon intensity. 
Furthermore social infrastructure services are very labour-intensive and therefore public 
investment in this area is a vehicle for generating more employment for a given rate of 
growth in national output —a target more consistent with low carbon emissions. 
Our analysis points at a number of further questions for future research. In this paper, we 
treated gender norms as exogenous; however, changes in employment patterns and gender 
gaps can have crucial effects on gender norms. Future research can analyse both exogenous 
and endogenous changes in occupational and sectoral gender segregation. To simplify the 
model, we also did not analyse the changes in population related to the impact of income, 
employment, social infrastructure and unpaid care on fertility and mortality rates as well as 
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migration. In particular, the gendered character of in the care sector and the intersection of 
gender, ethnic and racial inequalities present an important further research question. 
These findings hint at policy insights to address some urgent destabilizing economic and 
social issues in the UK and the world such as stagnation in productivity, unemployment, 
unhealthy growth driven by private debt or demographic and care crisis. An appropriate mix 
of the labour market and fiscal policies may help to tackle the multiple dimensions of 
inequalities with an aim to achieve both a stable macroeconomic environment and social 
cohesion.  
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Figure 1: The ratio of hourly wage rate of men/women (α) and share of women in hours 
worked (β) in the social sector (H) and the rest of the economy (N) in the UK 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU KLEMS database 
 
Figure 2: The effects of female and male wages in N on labour productivity in the next 
period  
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Figure 3: The effects of a simultaneous increase in female and male wages’ in N on total 
employment in the short-run and in the next period 
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Figure 4: The effects of an increase in public social infrastructure investment on total 
output in the short-run  
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Figure 5: The effects of an increase in public social infrastructure investment on labour 
productivity in the next period  
 
 
Figure 6: The effects of an increase in public social infrastructure investment on total 
output in the next period 
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Figure 7: The effects of public social infrastructure investment on total employment in 
the short-run and in the next period 
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Figure 8: The effects of closing the gender wage gap in H on total output in the short-
run  
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Figure 9: The share of wages in GDP (adjusted, at factor cost) and wealth concentration 
(share of top 1% in total net wealth, λ) in the UK 
 
Source: AMECO for wage share and WIID for wealth concentration 
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Table 1: The regimes and their conditions in the case of an increase in female and male 
wages in N with a constant gender wage gap (𝛼𝑡
𝑁 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑁∗, 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 = 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁∗ ) 
Case 
Growth 
Regime 
Condition 
 Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 > 0 
Wage-led in 
the short-run 
(|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁 
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
) > 
−(|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
 𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
) 
 Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 < 0 
Profit-led in 
the short-run 
(|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁 
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
) < 
−(|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
 𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
) 
 (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 +Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 ) > 0 
Wage-led in 
the medium-
run 
Ambiguous due to effects on productivity 
 (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 +Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 ) < 0 
Profit-led in 
the medium-
run 
Ambiguous due to effects on productivity 
 
Table 2: The demand regimes in the short-run 
  Wage-led in the short run Profit-led in the short-run 
Female 
wage-led/ 
gender 
equality-led 
in the short-
run 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
total consumption|  
>  
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
investment + net exports| 
 
& 
 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on total consumption|  
> 
 |Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on investment + net 
exports| 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
investment + net exports| 
> 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
total consumption| 
> 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on total consumption|  
> 
 |Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on investment + net 
exports| 
Gender 
inequality- 
led in the 
short-run 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
total consumption|  
> 
 |Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
investment + net exports| 
 >  
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on investment + net 
exports  
> 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on total consumption|  
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
total consumption|  
<  
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹& 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀(constant 𝛼𝑡
𝑁) on 
investment + net exports| 
 
& 
 
|Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on total consumption|  
< 
 |Impact of 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹on investment + net 
exports| 
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Table 3: Estimation results for consumption in N and H 
Dependent variable ΔlogCNt ΔlogCHt 
Variable Coeff. 
p-
value 
Coeff. 
p-
value 
Constant 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.081 
Δlog(Rt(1-tRt)) 0.085 0.000 0.063 0.235 
Δlog(WBFt(1-tWt)) 0.150 0.041 0.304 0.109 
Δlog(WBMt(1-tWt)) 0.375 0.000 0.244 0.291 
Δlog(PW99t(1-tPWt)) 0.132 0.008 -0.072 0.569 
Δlog(PW1t(1-tPWt)) 0.017 0.478 -0.053 0.381 
Adj. R2 0.735 0.134 
DW statistic 1.529 1.394 
Sample 1971-2015 1971-2015 
Estimation method: SUR   
 
 
Table 4: Estimation results for private investment 
Dependent variable ΔlogIt 
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Constant -0.947 0.004 
Δlog(πt(1-tRt)) 0.196 0.090 
ΔlogYt 1.282 0.039 
Δlog(PW1t(1-tPWt)) -0.058 0.503 
Δlog(PW99t(1-tPWt)) 0.389 0.031 
Δlog(D/Y)t -0.289 0.016 
logIt-1 -0.276 0.000 
logYt-1 0.403 0.001 
log(PW1t-1(1-tPWt-1)) -0.074 0.045 
Adj. R2 0.694 
DW statistic 2.031 
Sample 1971-2016 
Estimation method: Error correction model   
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Table 5: Estimation results for exports 
Dependent variable ΔlogXt 
Variable Coeff. 
p-
value 
Constant -0.014 0.213 
Δlog(πt) 0.124 0.299 
ΔlogYWorldt 1.741 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.418 
DW statistic 1.778 
Sample 1971-2016 
Estimation method: OLS in first differences   
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation results for imports 
Dependent variable ΔlogMt 
Variable Coeff. 
p-
value 
Constant -2.261 0.005 
Δlog(πt) -0.182 0.129 
ΔlogYNt 1.591 0.000 
logMt-1 -0.259 0.005 
logYNt-1 0.534 0.005 
Adj. R2 0.678 
DW statistic 2.615 
Sample 1971-2016 
Estimation method: Error correction model   
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Table 7: Estimation results for productivity in N 
Dependent variable logTit  
Variable Coeff. p-value  
logYi(t-1) 0.231 0.011  
logIi(t-1) -0.100 0.149  
logwFi(t-1) 0.679 0.000  
logαi(t-1) 0.564 0.000  
log(GHt-1+CHt-1)/Nt-1 0.267 0.019  
log(IGt-1)/Nt-1 -0.029 0.293  
Constant -0.534 0.230  
Adj. R2 0.920 
Number of observations 162 
Number of sectors 18 
Sample 1971-2016 
Estimation method: Fixed effects panel regression   
Note: The time indicator t refers to five year non-overlapping average of explanatory variables starting from 
1970 and of the dependent variable starting from 1971. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimation results for private net wealth 
Dependent variable ΔlogPWt(1-tPWt-1)  
Variable Coeff. p-value  
Constant -0.002 0.776  
Δlog(WBFt(1-tWt)) 0.496 0.016  
Δlog(WBMt(1-tWt)) 0.420 0.091  
Δlog(Rt(1-tRt)) 0.213 0.000  
Δlog(PWt-1(1-tPWt-1)) 0.333 0.016  
Adj. R2 0.606 
DW statistic 1.842 
Sample 1972-2015 
Estimation method: OLS in first differences   
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Table 9: Estimation results for private net wealth concentration 
Dependent variable logλt   
Variable Coeff. p-value   
Constant -0.081 0.671   
log(πt-1(1-tRt-1)) 0.108 0.452   
log(πt-2(1-tRt-2)) -0.229 0.227   
log(πt-3(1-tRt-3)) 0.244 0.095   
logλt-1 0.854 0.000   
logtPWt-1 -0.058 0.075   
Adj. R2 0.809 
DW statistic 2.282 
Sample 1973-2016 
Estimation method: Autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL)   
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Table 10: The total (post-multiplier) effects of changes in wages and gender pay gap on the components of aggregate demand (as a ratio to GDP), GDP, 
employment and public debt/GDP 
 
Notes:(i) Column (9)=(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)+(6)+(7)+(8). In each column, the effects in Appendices 3-4 are multiplied by the wage rate in the relevant sector and divided by Y.   
(ii) SR: short run. MR: medium-run, defined as the cumulative of the effects in the short-run and the next period when productivity changes.  
(iii) Sum of the effects in simulations (A) and (C) 
(iv) Sum of the effects in simulations (A), (B), (C) and (D) 
%-point change 
in consumption 
in N /GDP
%-point change 
in consumption 
in H /GDP
%-point change 
in private 
investment 
/GDP
%-point change 
in exports /GDP
%-point change 
in imports in N 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public social 
infrastructure 
investment  
/GDP
%-point change 
in government 
current 
expenditure 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public 
physical 
infrastructure 
investment 
/GDP
% Change 
in GDP
% change in 
total 
employment
% change in 
female 
employment
% change in 
male 
employment
%-point change in 
public debt /GDP
ΔCN/Y ΔCH/Y ΔI/Y ΔX/Y ΔM/Y ΔGH/Y ΔGC/Y ΔIG/Y ΔY/Y ΔE/E ΔEF/EF ΔEM/EM ΔD/Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(i) 
(10) (11) (12) (13)
SR (ii) 0.356 0.013 0.046 -0.045 0.188 0.030 0.025 0.007 0.244 0.257 0.263 0.251 -0.184
MR (ii) 0.133 0.002 0.067 -0.008 0.085 0.018 0.015 0.004 0.146 -0.556 -0.472 -0.623 -0.208
SR 0.091 0.006 0.013 -0.014 0.051 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.063 -0.053
MR 0.048 0.003 0.011 -0.011 0.031 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.027 -0.105 -0.089 -0.118 -0.069
SR 0.215 0.064 0.121 0.000 0.163 0.134 0.043 0.013 0.427 0.449 0.461 0.440 -0.170
MR 0.067 0.057 0.108 0.020 0.086 0.122 0.034 0.010 0.330 -0.030 0.022 -0.071 -0.119
SR 0.148 0.051 0.086 0.000 0.116 0.090 0.030 0.009 0.298 0.314 0.322 0.308 -0.155
MR 0.044 0.046 0.079 0.014 0.063 0.082 0.024 0.007 0.232 -0.024 0.012 -0.054 -0.112
SR 0.571 0.077 0.167 -0.045 0.352 0.163 0.068 0.020 0.670 0.706 0.724 0.691 -0.354
MR 0.200 0.059 0.175 0.011 0.171 0.140 0.049 0.014 0.476 -0.586 -0.451 -0.694 -0.327
SR 0.811 0.133 0.266 -0.059 0.519 0.261 0.105 0.031 1.030 1.085 1.113 1.062 -0.562
MR 0.292 0.108 0.265 0.013 0.265 0.225 0.075 0.022 0.736 -0.715 -0.528 -0.865 -0.507
F. Upward convergence: The effects of a 2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H (closing gender pay gaps by 1% ; 1%  decline in α H iand αN (iv))
A. The effects of a 1%  increase in female and male wages in N
B.  Closing gender pay gap in N by 1% : the effects of a 1%  increase in only female wages in N (1%  decline in αN)
C. The effects of a 1%  increase in female and male wages in H
D.  Closing gender pay gap in H by 1% : the effects of a 1%  increase in only female wages in H (1%  decline in αH)
E: The effects of a 1%  increase in  female and male wages in both N and H (iii) 
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Table 11: The total (post-multiplier) effects of changes in fiscal policies on the components of aggregate demand (as a ratio to GDP), GDP, employment and 
public debt/GDP 
 
Notes: (i) Column (9)=(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)+(6)+(7)+(8). In each column, the marginal effects in Appendix 4 are divided by Y.   
(ii) SR: short run. MR: medium-run, defined as the cumulative of the effects in the short-run and the next period when productivity in N changes endogenously.  
 
%-point change 
in consumption 
in N /GDP
%-point change 
in consumption 
in H /GDP
%-point change 
in private 
investment 
/GDP
%-point change 
in exports /GDP
%-point change 
in imports in N 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public social 
infrastructure 
investment  
/GDP
%-point change 
in government 
current 
expenditure 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public 
physical 
infrastructure 
investment 
/GDP
% Change 
in GDP
% change in 
total 
employment
% change in 
female 
employment
% change in 
male 
employment
%-point change in 
public debt /GDP
ΔCN/Y ΔCH/Y ΔI/Y ΔX/Y ΔM/Y ΔGH/Y ΔGC/Y ΔIG/Y ΔY/Y ΔE/E ΔEF/EF ΔEM/EM ΔD/Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(i) 
(10) (11) (12) (13)
SR (ii) 1.847 0.071 0.960 0.000 1.200 1.435 0.365 0.107 3.585 5.454 6.722 4.437 -0.981
MR (ii) 0.649 0.018 0.753 0.148 0.545 1.328 0.276 0.081 2.707 1.674 3.238 0.420 0.497
SR 0.985 0.034 0.512 0.000 1.003 0.249 0.208 1.061 2.046 2.154 2.210 2.109 -0.213
MR 0.916 0.027 0.472 0.023 0.945 0.243 0.204 1.060 1.999 1.660 1.764 1.576 0.550
SR -0.194 -0.006 -0.057 0.000 -0.102 -0.025 -0.021 -0.006 -0.208 -0.219 -0.224 -0.214 -0.200
MR -0.230 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.094 -0.025 -0.021 -0.006 -0.207 -0.127 -0.143 -0.114 -0.478
SR 0.298 0.015 0.802 0.000 0.442 0.110 0.092 0.027 0.902 0.949 0.974 0.930 -4.264
MR 1.986 0.066 3.199 0.020 2.070 0.521 0.436 0.128 4.285 4.134 4.293 4.006 -10.268
SR -1.080 -0.038 -0.321 0.000 -0.570 -0.142 -0.119 -0.035 -1.164 -1.226 -1.257 -1.200 0.212
MR -1.156 -0.034 -0.394 -0.027 -0.614 -0.162 -0.136 -0.040 -1.335 -0.888 -0.983 -0.812 0.053
A. The effects of a 1% -point increase in public purple social infrastructure investment/GDP (κH)
B. The effects of a 1% -point increase in public green physical infrastructure investment/GDP (κG)
C. The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on profit income (t
R
)
D. The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on wealth (t
PW
)
E. The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on wage income (t
W
)
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Table 12: The total (post-multiplier) effects of mix of labour market and fiscal policies on the components of aggregate demand (as a ratio to GDP), GDP, 
employment and public debt/GDP 
 
Notes: (i) Column (9)=(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)+(6)+(7)+(8)  
(ii) Sum of the effects in simulations (A) in Table 11 and (F) in Table 10. 
(iii) Sum of the effects in simulations (A) and (B) in Table 11 and (F) in Table 10. 
(iv) The effects in simulations (C) minus (E) in Table 11. 
(v) The effects in simulations (A) plus (B) plus (C) plus (D) minus (E) in Table 11 plus  (F) in Table 10. 
 
%-point change 
in consumption 
in N /GDP
%-point change 
in consumption 
in H /GDP
%-point change 
in private 
investment 
/GDP
%-point change 
in exports /GDP
%-point change 
in imports in N 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public social 
infrastructure 
investment  
/GDP
%-point change 
in government 
current 
expenditure 
/GDP
%-point change 
in public 
physical 
infrastructure 
investment 
/GDP
% Change 
in GDP
% change in 
total 
employment
% change in 
female 
employment
% change in 
male 
employment
%-point change in 
public debt /GDP
ΔCN/Y ΔCH/Y ΔI/Y ΔX/Y ΔM/Y ΔGH/Y ΔGC/Y ΔIG/Y ΔY/Y ΔE/E ΔEF/EF ΔEM/EM ΔD/Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(i) 
(10) (11) (12) (13)
SR 2.658 0.205 1.226 -0.059 1.719 1.696 0.470 0.138 4.615 6.539 7.835 5.500 -1.543
MR 0.941 0.126 1.018 0.161 0.809 1.554 0.351 0.103 3.443 0.959 2.710 -0.445 -0.010
SR 3.643 0.239 1.738 -0.059 2.722 1.945 0.678 1.199 6.661 8.693 10.044 7.609 -1.756
MR 1.856 0.153 1.490 0.184 1.754 1.797 0.554 1.163 5.443 2.619 4.475 1.132 0.540
SR 0.887 0.032 0.264 0.000 0.469 0.116 0.097 0.029 0.956 1.007 1.033 0.986 -0.412
MR 0.926 0.029 0.385 0.022 0.519 0.137 0.115 0.034 1.129 0.761 0.840 0.698 -0.531
SR 4.827 0.286 2.804 -0.059 3.632 2.171 0.867 1.255 8.519 10.649 12.051 9.525 -6.431
MR 4.767 0.248 5.074 0.226 4.344 2.455 1.105 1.325 10.856 7.514 9.607 5.836 -10.259
B. Purple and green public investment and upward convergence in wages: The effects of a 1% -point increase in public social and physical infrastructure investment/GDP (κ H and κG) and closing gender gaps via 
upward convergence in wages via 2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H (iii)
C. Progressive income tax: The effects of a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on profit income (t
R
) and a 1% -point decrease in the tax rate on wages (t
W
) (iv)
D. Purple and green public investment,  upward convergence in wages, and progressive income and wealth taxation: a 1% -point increase in public social and physical infrastructure investment/GDP (κ H and κG) and 
closing gender gaps via upward convergence in wages via 2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on profit income (t
R
),  a 1% -point 
decrease in the tax rate on wages (t
W
) and a 1% -point increase in the tax rate on wealth (t
PW
)(v)
A. Purple public investment and upward convergence in wages: The effects of a 1% -point increase in public social infrastructure investment/GDP (κ H) and closing gender gaps via upward convergence in wages via 
2%  increase in  female wages and 1%  increase in male wages in both N and H (ii)
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Appendix 1: Variables and data sources 
 
Notes: (1) The data in 2018 release is linked  back with data in 2012 and 2009 releases 
(2) The ONS data for the composition of C starts in 1985; for the years before 1985 we assumed CH/C to be 
constant.  
Symbol Variable name Source Time period
Y Aggregate output, GDP (real), in billions AMECO 1970-2016
Total wage bill, labour compensation adjusted for the labour income of 
the self-employed (real), in billions AMECO, own calculations
1970-2015
Total wage bill for female workers (real, adjusted labour compensation), 
in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS (1)
1970-2015
Total wage bill for male workers (real, adjusted labour compensation), in 
billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS
1970-2015
Total employment in the public social sector (total hours worked by 
persons engaged in education and health & social work categories of 
the industrial classification of EUKLEMS), in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS
1970-2015
Total employment in the rest of the economy, in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Hours of Employment of women in the public social sector, in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Hours of Employment of men in the public social sector, in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Hours of Employment of women in the rest of the economy, in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS
1970-2015
Hours of Employment of men in the rest of the economy, in billions Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Average female hourly wage rate in the public social sector  (real) Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Average male hourly wage rate in the social sector  (real) Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Average female hourly wage rate in the rest of the economy  (real) Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Average male hourly wage rate in the rest of the economy  (real) Own calculations based on data from AMECO and EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Ratio between male and female wages in the public social sector Own calculations based on data from EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Ratio between male and female wages in the rest of the economy Own calculations based on data from EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Households’ private social expenditures  (real), in billions
Own calculations based on data from Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) (2016a) and AMECO (2)
1970-2016
Private consumption of goods and services in the rest of the economy  
(real), in billions
Own calculations based on data from Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) (2016) and AMECO (2)
1970-2016
Private investment   (real), in billions AMECO, own calculations 1970-2016
Government’s consumption expenditures  (real), in billions
Own calculations based on data from OECD National Accounts 
and AMECO
1970-2016
Public investments other than investments in the social sector  (real), in 
billions AMECO, own calculations
1970-2016
Government’s social infrastructure expenditures  (real), in billions
Own calculations based on data from OECD National Accounts 
and AMECO
1970-2016
M Imports  (real), in billions AMECO 1970-2016
X Exports  (real), in billions AMECO 1970-2016
Total expenditure in the social sector  (real), in billions G
H 1970-2016
Total expenditure in the rest of the economy  (real), in billions Y-Y
H 1970-2016
Share of government spending on the social sector in total output G
H
/Y 1970-2016
Share of government’s consumption expenditures in total output GC/Y 1970-2016Share of government spending on public investment in fixed capital in 
total output I
G
/Y 1970-2016
Productivity in the rest of the economy  (real) Y
N
/E
N 1970-2015
Share of women employed in the rest of the economy Own calculations based on data from EUKLEMS 1970-2015
Share of women employed in the public social sector Own calculations based on data from EUKLEMS 1970-2015
U Unpaid domestic care labour ONS 2016b 2014
Gross operating surplus  (real), in billions AMECO, own calculations 1970-2016
Profit share in the rest of the economy (R/Y
N
) AMECO, own calculations 1970-2016
Implicit tax rate on labour, % Euoprean Commission, Eurostat and Onaran et al. (2012) 1970-2016
Implicit tax rate on capital income, %
Own calculations based on Euoprean Commission, Eurostat and 
Onaran et al. (2012)
1970-2016
t
PW Implicit tax rate on wealth, %
Own calculations based on Eurostat,  EC (2000) and Onaran et al. 
(2012)
1970-2016
t
C Implicit tax rate on consumption, % Euoprean Commission, Eurostat and Onaran et al. (2012) 1970-2016
D/Y General government consolidated debt/Y AMECO, own calculations 1970-2016
PW Net private wealth (real), in billions
World Wealth and Income Database  and Credit Suisse (2014-17), 
own calculations
1970-2016
PW1 Net private wealth of top 1% (real), in billions
World Wealth and Income Database  and Credit Suisse (2014-17), 
own calculations
1970-2016
PW99 Net private wealth of 99% (real), in billions
World Wealth and Income Database  and Credit Suisse (2014-17), 
own calculations
1970-2016
λ Wealth concentration=Net private wealth of top 1% /Net private wealth
World Wealth and Income Database and Credit Suisse (2014-17), 
own calculations
1970-2016
Real exchange rate World Bank World Development Indicators 1970-2016
Rest of the world income
Own calculations based on World Bank World Development 
Indicators
1970-2016
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Definitions
Short-run impact of simultaneous increase in female and male wages in  
N  on total output
Partial effect of simultaneous increase in female and male wages N  on 
public debt/GDP in the short-run
Impact of simultaneous increase in female and male wages in N  on total 
output in the next period
Partial effect of simultaneous increase in female and male wages in  N  
on public debt/GDP in the next period
Short-run impact of increase in female wages (decline in gender wage 
gap) in  N  on total output
Partial effect of female wages (decline in gender wage gap) in  N  on 
public debt/GDP in the short-run
Impact of increase in female wages (decline in gender wage gap) in  N  
in the next period
Partial effect of increase in female wages (decline in gender wage gap) 
in  N  on public debt/GDP in the next period
Short-run impact of rising share of social expenditures in GDP on total 
output
Partial effect of rising share of social expenditures in GDP on public 
debt/GDP in the short-run
Impact of rising share of social expenditures in GDP on total output in 
the next period
Partial effect increase rising share of social expenditures on public 
debt/GDP in the next period
Short-run impact of increase in female wages (decline in gender wage 
gap) in  H  on total output
Partial effect of increase in female wages (decline in gender wage gap) 
in  H  on public debt/GDP in the short-run
Impact of increase in female wages (decline in gender wage gap) in  H  
in the next period
Partial effect increase in female wages (decline in gender wage gap) in  
H on public debt/GDP in the next period
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Appendix 2: Deriving the reduced form export and import functions 
Exports are a function of relative prices of exports to imports, the GDP of the rest of the 
world and exchange rate. 
  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋 = 𝑥0 + 𝑥1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑟𝑤 + 𝑥𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑥/𝑃𝑚) + 𝑥3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸 (A2.1) 
Imports depend on domestic prices relative to import prices, the exchange rate and 
aggregate demand in YN. 
  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑁 + 𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃/𝑃𝑚) + 𝑛3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸 (A2.2) 
Domestic prices (𝑃) and export prices (𝑃𝑥) are set as a mark-up on unit labour costs and 
other imported input costs depending on the oligopolistic market power of firms in an 
imperfectly competitive economy as follows: 
   𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 = 𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑢𝑙𝑐) + 𝑝𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑚 (A2.3) 
  log𝑃𝑥 = 𝑝𝑥0 + 𝑝𝑥𝑢𝑙𝑐log(𝑢𝑙𝑐) + 𝑝𝑥𝑚log𝑃𝑚 (A2.4) 
where 𝑢𝑙𝑐 denotes nominal unit labour costs, 𝑃𝑚 stands for import prices. 
As nominal unit labour costs are real unit labour costs multiplied by domestic prices, and 
the wage share is identical to real unit labour costs (corrected for the ratio of GDP at factor 
cost to GDP at market prices), a fall in the wage share, i.e. a rise in the profit share, leads to a 
fall in relative prices and improves net exports, depending on the labour intensity of exports, 
the pass through from labour costs to export prices and domestic prices and the price 
elasticity of exports and imports. 
Hence in reduced form, the marginal effect of   on exports/GDP and imports/GDP is given 
by: 
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 (A2.7) 
x2 and n2 in the reduced form in Equations (25)-(26) in Section 2 are a direct way of 
modelling these chain derivatives.
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Appendix 3: The effects of wages and gender pay gap 
A3.1 The effects of a change in female and male wages in N   
A3.1.1 The short-run effect of a change in female and male wages in N on aggregate output 
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where 𝜑𝑁𝐹is 
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(A3.2) 
which will be defined in A3.1.5. 
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𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = 0 (A3.4) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A3.5) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹𝑡
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A3.6) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊1𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+
1
𝜆𝑡
|
𝜕𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)                                      
 
 
(A3.7) 
. 
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|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊99𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+
1
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
|
𝜕(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)                                                                        
(A3.8) 
where 
 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 − 𝑎𝑅
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝑅𝑡
) (A3.9) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)  
(A3.10) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 − 𝑧𝑅
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)  
(A3.11) 
 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐹
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
)
 
 
 
(A3.12) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
 𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= − 
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 < 0 (A3.13) 
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𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐹 = |
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
=
1
𝑌𝑡
((𝑡𝑡
𝑅 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀)
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A3.14) 
. |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
< 0 (A3.15) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
> 0 (A3.16) 
  
A3.1.2 The effect of a change in female and male wages in N on aggregate output in the next 
period 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = −𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
 (A3.17) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = −(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
 (A3.18) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A3.19) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A3.20) 
 
 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
1 −𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A3.21) 
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|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
 
 
ℎ1
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + (ℎ2 + ℎ3)
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹
𝑌𝑡−1
+
ℎ4
𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
)
 
 
 
(A3.22) 
where 
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹  
(A3.23) 
and 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝑌𝑡−1,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹  (A3.24) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
)                                      
(A3.25) 
where  
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑐𝐹
𝜆𝑡(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝜆𝑡𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝜆𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝐶
𝜆𝑡
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ 𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ 𝑠1𝑠5
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
)                                    
 
(A3.26) 
 
73 
 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑐𝐹
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝐶
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
− 𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
− 𝑠1𝑠5
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
)                                                                                                
(A3.27) 
where 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= − 
(𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝛽𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡−1
𝑁 )
𝑇𝑡−1
𝑁 < 0 (A3.28) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
(𝐸𝑡−1
𝐹𝑁 + (𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹 )
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
(𝐸𝑡−1
𝑀𝑁𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + (𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹 )
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀
+ 𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑅𝑡−1
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝐸𝑡−1
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹 ) + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 (𝐸𝑡−1
𝑀𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1))
𝐹 )
𝑅𝑡−1
  ) 
(A3.29) 
where 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 , 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 , 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 , 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀  are the effects of previous period’s output on previous 
period’s employment. 
 |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)(𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
    (A3.30) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
)                                      
(A3.31) 
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|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐹
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
)
 
 
      
(A3.32) 
 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐹 = |
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
1
𝑌𝑡
= (|
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A3.33) 
 
where 
 |
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑌𝑡−1 |
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐹 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A3.34) 
 
 |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
      (A3.35) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
      (A3.36) 
A3.1.3 The effect of a change in female and male wages on employment 
 |
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 (A3.37) 
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 |
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 (A3.38) 
 
 |
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 (A3.39) 
 
 
|
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹
+
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹  
(A3.40) 
 
 
|
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹
+
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹  
(A3.41) 
 
 
|
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹  
(A3.42) 
 
A3.1.4 The effect of a change in female and male wages on public debt 
 
 |
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑊𝐹 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝐹 (A3.43) 
  
 |
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 |
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
= 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑊𝐹 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹  (A3.44) 
 
A3.1.5 Income multiplier 
 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 =
1
1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹
 (A3.45) 
where 𝜑𝑁𝐹 is  
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𝜑𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
|
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
|
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
|
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
|
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
|
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹,𝛼𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝜅𝑡
𝐻 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐶 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐺 
(A3.46) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = 𝛽𝑡
𝑁  
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 > 0  (A3.47) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁) 
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 > 0    (A3.48) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
> 0    (A3.49) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝑀 =
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
> 0       (A3.50) 
 
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑐𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)     
(A3.51) 
 
  
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑧𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)     
(A3.52) 
where 
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊1𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+
1
𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)
= 𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
1
𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)                                      
(A3.53) 
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊99𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+
1
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕(1 − 𝜆)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
1
𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)                                                                              
(A3.54) 
where 
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𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
) 
(A3.55) 
 
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡  
(
 
 
 
 
𝑖1
1
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖2
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
(
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
 
 
    
(A3.56) 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
=  0 (A3.57) 
 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌 =
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
=
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
2 =
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
−
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
2 
(A3.58) 
 
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌 =
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= ((𝜅𝑡
𝐻 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐶 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐺) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
− (𝑡𝑡
𝑊 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑀) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝑒𝑌𝑡
𝐻𝑀)
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
) −
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
)  
1
𝑌𝑡
    
(A3.58’) 
 
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡 (𝑥2
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
) = 0 (A3.59) 
 
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡 (
𝑛1
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑛2 (
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)) =    
𝑀𝑡𝑛1
𝑌𝑡
> 0 (A3.60) 
A3.2 The effects of a change in gender wage gap in N   
A3.2.1 The short-run effect of closing the gender pay gap with rising female wages in N on 
aggregate output 
As the male wages in N are constant, the rising female wages will reduce the gender pay gap 
in N in the following way: 
 𝑑𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = −
𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 
(A3.61) 
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Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡 
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
 𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
1 −𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A3.62) 
. |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = 0 (A3.63) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = 0 (A3.64) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A3.65) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A3.66) 
 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊1𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
+
1
𝜆𝑡
|
𝜕𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
) = 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
+
𝑃𝑊𝑡𝜆𝑡 (𝑠1
1
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑠3
1
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)                                      
(A3.67) 
.|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊99𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
+
1
(1−𝜆𝑡)
|
𝜕(1−𝜆𝑡)
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
) = (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
−
𝑃𝑊𝑡𝜆𝑡 (𝑠1
1
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑠3
1
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)                                                                        
(A3.68) 
where 
 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 − 𝑎𝑅
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
) (A3.69) 
and 
 |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
 𝑌𝑡
= − 
𝛽𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 < 0 (A3.70) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 − 𝑐𝑅
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)  
(A3.71) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 − 𝑧𝑅
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)  
(A3.72) 
79 
 
 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝛼
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
 
(A3.73) 
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝛼 = |
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡
=
1
𝑌𝑡
((𝑡𝑡
𝑅 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹) − 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
)
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A3.74) 
 
 |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
< 0 (A3.75) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
> 0 (A3.76) 
 A3.2.2 The effect of closing the gender pay gap with rising female wages in N on aggregate 
output in the next period 
As the male wages in N are constant, the rising female wages will reduce the gender pay gap 
in N in previous period as in equation (A3.77). 
 
𝑑𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 = −
𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹  (A3.77) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = −𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A3.78) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = −(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A3.79) 
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 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A3.80) 
 |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A3.81) 
 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡 
1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A3.82) 
 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
 
 
ℎ1
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + (ℎ2 + ℎ3)
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼
𝑌𝑡−1
+
(ℎ4 − ℎ5)
𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
)
 
 
 
(A3.83) 
where 
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹  
(A3.84) 
and 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝑌𝑡−1
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡
|
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡,𝑌𝑡−1
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼  
(A3.85) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)                                      
(A3.86) 
where  
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|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑐𝐹
𝜆𝑡(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝜆𝑡𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝜆𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝐶
𝜆𝑡
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑠1𝑠5
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)                                    
              
(A3.87) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑐𝐹
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )(1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝐶
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑠1𝑠5
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡−1
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)                                                                                                
(A3.88) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= − 
𝛽𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑇𝑡−1
𝑁 < 0 (A3.89) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1(𝑎𝐹
(𝐸𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁 + (𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼 )
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
((𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼 )
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀
+ 𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑅𝑡−1
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝐸𝐹(𝑡−1)
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼 ) + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼
𝑅𝑡−1
 ) 
(A3.90) 
where 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 , 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 , 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 , 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀  are effects of previous period’s output on previous 
period’s employment. 
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 |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
    (A3.91) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)                                      
(A3.92) 
 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
      
(A3.93) 
 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐹 = |
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
 𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A3.94) 
 
where   
 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A3.95) 
 |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
      (A3.96) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
      (A3.97) 
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A3.2.3 The effect of closing the gender pay gap with rising female wages in N on employment  
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = 𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼  (A3.98) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼  (A3.99) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼  (A3.100) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 = 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼  (A3.101) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 = 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼
+
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼  
(A3.102) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 = 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼  (A3.103) 
A3.2.4 The effect of closing the gender pay gap with rising female wages in N on public debt 
 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼  (A3.104) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼  (A3.105) 
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Appendix 4 The effects of fiscal policy 
A4.1 The effects of public social infrastructure investment 
In this section, we analyse  the case where social expenditure increase solely through new 
public sector employment in the social sector rather than rising wages in this sector (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀 =
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀∗, 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹∗). 
A4.1.1 The short-run effect of a change in public social infrastructure investment/GDP on 
aggregate output 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 + |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
(
 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1 −𝜑𝑘
+ 𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
∗  
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.1) 
where 
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1 −𝜑𝑘
 
 
(A4.2) 
and 
𝜑𝑘 = |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.3) 
and the multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑘
) (
1
1−𝑡
𝐻) which will be shown in detail in A4.1.5. 
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
  
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0    (A4.4) 
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
  
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
 > 0  (A4.5) 
  𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.6) 
 𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.7) 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.8) 
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|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.9) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (A4.10) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (A4.11) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 ) (A4.12) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.13) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡 (𝑖1
1
1 − 𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑘
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.14) 
where 
  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑘 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.15) 
and 
 
|
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑌𝑡(1 + 𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑡
𝐺)
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀 + 𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.16) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.17) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.18) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0 (A4.19) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0 (A4.20) 
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  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑡
𝐺𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0 (A4.21) 
A4.1.2 The effect of a change in public social infrastructure investment/GDP on aggregate 
output in the next period 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.22) 
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)
 
(A4.23) 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
  
 
ℎ1
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑘 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻
+ ℎ2
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑘 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐺 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺 + ℎ3 (
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑘
𝑌𝑡−1
−
1
(1 − 𝑡−1
𝐻 )
)
)
  
 
 
(A4.24) 
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
|
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (A4.25) 
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
  (A4.26) 
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
   (A4.27) 
  𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A4.28) 
 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A4.29) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (A4.30) 
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|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.31) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) (A4.32) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) (A4.33) 
where 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
) 
(A4.34) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀   )
+ 
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁  
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻  
 
(A4.35) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.36) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
)
 
 
 
(A4.37) 
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𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.38) 
 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑘 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.39) 
 
.|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑋𝑡(𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
) (A4.40) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.41) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.42) 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.43) 
A4.1.3 The effect of a change in public social infrastructure investment/GDP on employment 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
+
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
 
(A4.44) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
+
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
 
 
(A4.45) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
+
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
 
 
(A4.46) 
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𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 +
𝛽𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 + (
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (A4.47) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 + (
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (A4.48) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + 
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 + (
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (A4.49) 
A4.1.4 The effect of a change in public social infrastructure investment/GDP on public debt 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑘 +
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻  
(A4.50) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘 +
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻  
(A4.51) 
A4.1.5 Multiplier (with respect to Yn)  
 
𝜑𝑘 = |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
 
(A4.52) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹 = 
𝛽𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 > 0  (A4.53) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = 
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 > 0    (A4.54) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
> 0    (A4.55) 
 
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝑀 =
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
> 0       (A4.56) 
 
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑐𝑅
1 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 )     
(A4.57) 
where 
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑃𝑊1𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 +
1
𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁) = 𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁  (A4.58) 
and 
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𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑃𝑊99𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 +
1
(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕(1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 ) = (1 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁  (A4.59) 
where 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
(𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
(𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑎𝑅
1 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
) 
(A4.60) 
 
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 + 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑧𝑅
1 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 )     
(A4.61) 
  
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝐼𝑡  
(
 
 
 
 
𝑖1
1
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑖3
(
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 )
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
)
 
 
 
 
    
(A4.62) 
 
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 =
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 𝑌𝑡 −
𝐷𝑡
1 − 𝑡
𝐻
𝑌𝑡
2 =
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑌𝑡
−
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
2(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.63) 
 
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = (
𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑡
𝐺
1 − 𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅 − (𝑡𝑡
𝑊 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑀 )
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑊𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝑒𝑌𝑁𝑡
𝐻𝑀 ) − 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
+
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)
−
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
)  
1
𝑌𝑡
    
(A4.63’) 
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𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑋𝑡 (𝑥2
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
) = 0 (A4.64) 
 
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑀𝑡 (
𝑛1
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑛2 (
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
)) =    
𝑀𝑡𝑛1
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 > 0 (A4.65) 
A4.2 The effects of a change in female and male wages in H   
 A4.2.1 The short-run effect of in a change in female and male wages in H on aggregate 
output  
The impact of rising wages in H on public social expenditures/GDP is  
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 
(𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.66) 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
(
 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑡 |
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
)
 
 
∗
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.67) 
where 
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
 
(A4.68) 
𝜑𝑘 = |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
 
(A4.69) 
and the multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑘
) (
1
1−𝑡
𝐻). 
 The partial derivatives on employment are zero  
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.70) 
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  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.71) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.72) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.73) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.74) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐻𝑀 ) (A4.75) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.76) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝐼𝑡 (𝑖1
1
1 − 𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑊𝐻
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.77) 
where 
  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑊𝐻 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
1
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.78) 
and 
 
|
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑌𝑡(1 + 𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑡
𝐺)
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑤(𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 + 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹)
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.79) 
 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.80) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.81) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
> 0 (A4.82) 
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  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑡
𝐺𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
> 0 (A4.83) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
> 0 (A4.84) 
A4.2.2 The effect of in a change in female and male wages in H on aggregate output in the 
next period 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.85) 
where 
|
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)
 
(A4.86) 
The rising wage in H also increases the public social expenditures/GDP in the previous 
period by the following amount: 
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 =
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻𝑀 +𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 (𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑌𝑡−1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
+ Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐻 𝑡−1
𝐻
 (A4.87) 
 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
  
 
ℎ1
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐻 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻
+ ℎ2
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐻 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐺 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺
+ ℎ3 (
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐻
𝑌𝑡−1
−
1
(1 − 𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )
)
  
 
 
(A4.88) 
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  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
|
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (A4.89) 
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
  (A4.90) 
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
   (A4.91) 
  𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.92) 
 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.93) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (A4.94) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.95) 
 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) (A4.96) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) (A4.97) 
where 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
) 
(A4.98) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀 )
+ 
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁  |
𝑑𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻 ,𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻
 
(A4.99) 
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|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
) 
(A4.100) 
 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
)
 
 
 
(A4.101) 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.102) 
 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐻 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.103) 
 
.|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑋𝑡(𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
) (A4.104) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.105) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.106) 
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  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (A4.107) 
A4.2.3 The effect of in a change in female and male wages on employment 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐻 (A4.108) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐻 
 
(A4.109) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐻 
 
(A4.110) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ (
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻  
(A4.111) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ (
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻  
(A4.112) 
 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + 
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
+ (
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻  
(A4.113) 
 
A4.2.4 The effect of in a change in female and male wages on public debt 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐻 +
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡
𝐻,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.114) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐻 +
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻 ,𝛼𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.115) 
 
A4.3 The effects of a change in the gender wage gap in H   
A4.3.1 The short-run effect of in a change in gender wage gap in H on aggregate output 
The impact of rising social expenditures through closing the gender wage gap in H, i.e. 
increasing female wages with a constant male wage on public social expenditures/GDP is  
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.116) 
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Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
(
 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
+ |
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
∗
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.117) 
where 
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
(1 −𝜑𝑘)
 
(A4.118) 
𝜑𝑘 = |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
 
(A4.119) 
The partial derivatives on employment are zero  
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.120) 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.121) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.122) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.123) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.124) 
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|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐻𝐹) (A4.125) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.126) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝐼𝑡 (𝑖1
1
1 − 𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.127) 
where 
  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
1
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.128) 
and 
 
|
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑌𝑡(1 + 𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑡
𝐺)
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
− 𝑡𝑡
𝑤(𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
) 
(A4.129) 
 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.130) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 0 (A4.131) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
> 0 (A4.132) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
> 0 (A4.133) 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
=
𝑡
𝐺𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
|
𝑑𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
> 0 (A4.134) 
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A4.3.2 The effect of in a change in the gender wage gap in H on aggregate output in the next 
period 
Closing the gender wage gap in H with increasing female wages in H also increases the 
public social expenditures/GDP in the previous period by the following amount: 
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 =
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 + 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 (𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑌𝑡−1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
+ Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 𝑡−1
𝐻
 (A4.135) 
and 
 𝑑𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = −
𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹  
(A4.136) 
 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(A4.137) 
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)
 
 
(A4.138) 
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|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
  
 
ℎ1
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻
+ ℎ2
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐺 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺
+ ℎ3 (
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻
𝑌𝑡−1
−
1
(1 − 𝑡−1
𝐻 )
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )
)
  
 
 
(A4.139) 
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻 ,𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
|
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
 (A4.140) 
 
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
  (A4.141) 
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
   (A4.142) 
  𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 0 (A4.143) 
 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 0 (A4.144) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻  
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
 (A4.145) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
) 
(A4.146) 
 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
) (A4.147) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
) (A4.148) 
101 
 
where 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
) 
(A4.149) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝑒𝛼(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀 )
+
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁  
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹  
 
(A4.150) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
) 
(A4.151) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
)
 
 
 
(A4.152) 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.153) 
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 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.154) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.155) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.156) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 0 (A4.157) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 0 (A4.158) 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
= 0 (A4.159) 
A4.3.3 The effect of a change in the gender wage gap in H on employment 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻 (A4.160) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻 
 
(A4.161) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻 
 
(A4.162) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹  (
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻  (A4.163) 
 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
+ (
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻  
(A4.164) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝛼𝐻(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 +
1
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
+ (
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻  
(A4.165) 
A4.3.4 The effect of a change in the gender wage gap in H on public debt 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝛼𝐻 +
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡
𝐻
 (A4.166) 
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𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝛼𝐻 +
𝜕 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁 |
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 |
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐻
 (A4.167) 
A4.4 The effects of public physical infrastructure 
A4.4.1 The short-run effect of a change in public physical infrastructure investment/GDP on 
aggregate output 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐺 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐺 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑡
1 −𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A4.168) 
and the multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). 
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.169) 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.170) 
  |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.171) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.172) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.173) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡 (𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐺
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
) (A4.174) 
where 
  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐺 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= 1 (A4.175) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.176) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐺|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.177) 
A4.4.2 The effect of a change in public physical infrastructure investment/GDP on aggregate 
output in the next period 
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Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐺
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
 
(A4.178) 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
 
 
ℎ1
(|
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻
+ ℎ2
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐺 + 𝑌𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺
)
 
 
 
(A4.179) 
.𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.180) 
𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
   (A4.181) 
  𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A4.182) 
 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A4.183) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.184) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.185) 
 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.186) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.187) 
where 
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|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
) 
(A4.188) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐻𝑀
+ (𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺
𝑅𝑡−1
)
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺
𝑅𝑡−1
     ) 
 
(A4.189) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.190) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
 
(A4.191) 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.192) 
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 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐺 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝐺 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.193) 
.|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡(𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
) (A4.194) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.195) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.196) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.197) 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.198) 
A4.4.3 The effect of a change in public physical infrastructure investment/GDP on 
employment 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡
𝐺 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐺  (A4.199) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡
𝐺 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐺  
 
(A4.200) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐺 = (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐺  
 
(A4.201) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐺 = 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺  (A4.202) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐺 = 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺  (A4.203) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐺 = 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝐺(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺  (A4.204) 
A4.4.4 The effect of a change in public physical infrastructure investment/GDP on public 
debt 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐺 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝐺  (A4.205) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐺 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺  (A4.206) 
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A4.5 The effects of taxes 
A4.5.1 The short-run effect of a change in taxes on profits on aggregate output 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑅 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅|
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
1 −𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A4.207) 
and the multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). 
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.208) 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.209) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (−𝑐𝑅
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.210) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊1𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+
1
𝜆𝑡
|
𝜕𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅|
𝑌𝑡
)
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)
)                                      
(A4.211) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊99𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
−
1
𝜆𝑡
|
𝜕𝜆𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅|
𝑌𝑡
)
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)
)                                      
(A4.212) 
 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (−𝑎𝑅
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)
) (A4.213) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (−𝑧𝑅
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.214) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡 (−𝑖2
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.215) 
where 
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  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.216) 
|
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= −𝑅𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.217) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.218) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.219) 
A4.5.2 The effect of a change in the taxes on profit in the next period 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
 
(A4.220) 
 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
 
 
ℎ1
𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅 + |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + (ℎ2 + ℎ3)
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅
𝑌𝑡−1
)
 
 
 (A4.221) 
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡,𝑌𝑡−1
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅  (A4.222) 
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.223) 
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
   (A4.224) 
  𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A4.225) 
 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A4.226) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.227) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.228) 
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|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑠1𝑠5
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 )
) (A4.229) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑠1𝑠5
1
(1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 )
) (A4.230) 
where 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
) 
(A4.231) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐻𝑀
+ 𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅
𝑅𝑡−1
− 𝑎𝑅
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅
𝑅𝑡−1
     ) 
 
(A4.232) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.233) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
 
(A4.234) 
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𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝐺 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.235) 
 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.236) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.237) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.238) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.239) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.240) 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.241) 
A4.5.3 The effect of a change in taxes on profits on employment 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 (A4.242) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 
 
(A4.243) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 =  (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 (A4.244) 
 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅  (A4.245) 
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𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅  
(A4.246) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑇𝑅(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅  
(A4.247) 
A4.5.4 The effect of a change in taxes on profits on public debt 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑅 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑅 (A4.248) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑅  (A4.249) 
A4.6.1 The short-run effect of a change in taxes on wealth on aggregate output 
 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
1 −𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A4.250) 
and the multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). 
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.251) 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.252) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁(𝑐𝑃𝑊1 (
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
−
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99 (
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
−
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) 
(A4.253) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡𝜆𝑡 (𝑠2
1
𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)                                 (A4.254) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡𝜆𝑡 (𝑠2
1
𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)                                       (A4.255) 
.|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (−
1
1−𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)                                      (A4.256) 
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|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻(𝑧𝑃𝑊1 (
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
−
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99 (
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
−
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊)) 
(A4.257) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡 (𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.258) 
where 
  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.259) 
|
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= −𝑃𝑊𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.260) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.261) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.262) 
A4.6.2 The effect of a change in the wealth tax on aggregate output in the next period 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
 
(A4.263) 
 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
 
 
ℎ1
𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 + |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + (ℎ2 + ℎ3)
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑌𝑡−1
)
 
 
 (A4.264) 
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡,𝑌𝑡−1
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  (A4.265) 
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.266) 
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
   (A4.267) 
  𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A4.268) 
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 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A4.269) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.270) 
 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.271) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑠2𝑠5
1
𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊) (A4.272) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑠2𝑠5
1
𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊) (A4.273) 
where 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 (|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
−
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊)) 
(A4.274) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀
+ 𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑅𝑡−1
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑅𝑡−1
+
1
1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊) 
 
(A4.275) 
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|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑅 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.276) 
 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
 
(A4.277) 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.278) 
 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.279) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.280) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.281) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.282) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.283) 
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  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.284) 
A4.6.3 The effect of a change in the wealth tax on employment 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 (A4.285) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 
 
(A4.286) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 =  (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 
 
(A4.287) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  (A4.288) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  
(A4.289) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  
(A4.290) 
A4.6.4 The effect of a change in the wealth tax on public debt 
 
𝑑(
𝐷
𝑌
)
𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 (A4.291) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  (A4.292) 
A4.7.1 The short-run effect of a change in taxes on wages on aggregate output 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑊 =
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
1 −𝜑𝑁𝐹
 
(A4.293) 
and the multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑁𝐹
). 
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.294) 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.295) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (−
(𝑐𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀)
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.296) 
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|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊1𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) = 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.297) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊99𝑡 (
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) = (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.298) 
 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= −𝑃𝑊𝑡 (
(𝑎𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀)
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)
) (A4.299) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (−
(𝑧𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀)
(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.300) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡 (𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.301) 
where 
  𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.302) 
|
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= −(𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 +𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.303) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.304) 
|
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑊|
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.305) 
A4.7.2 The effect of a change in the taxes on wages on aggregate output in the next period 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
(1 − 𝜑𝑁𝐹)
 
(A4.306) 
|
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁
(
 
 
ℎ1
𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 + |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + (ℎ2 + ℎ3)
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑌𝑡−1
)
 
 
 (A4.307) 
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡,𝑌𝑡−1
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡−1
|
𝑌𝑡
Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  (A4.308) 
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𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.309) 
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 = |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= −
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
   (A4.310) 
  𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 = 0 (A4.311) 
 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 = 0 (A4.312) 
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
 (A4.313) 
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑐𝑀
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.314) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.315) 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= (1 − 𝜆𝑡) |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑠1
𝜆𝑡
𝜋𝑡
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) (A4.316) 
where 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡 (𝑎𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑐 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
) 
(A4.317) 
and 
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑃𝑊𝑡−1 (𝑎𝐹
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝐹
+ 𝑎𝑀
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝐻𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝐻𝐹 𝛼𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑊𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀
−
(𝑎𝐹 + 𝑎𝑀)
1 − 𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 + 𝑎𝑅
(1 − 𝜅𝑡−1
𝐻 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑅𝑡−1
− 𝑎𝑅
(𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑒𝑌(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 )Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
𝑅𝑡−1
) 
 
(A4.318) 
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|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝑁
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊1
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑧𝑃𝑊99
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(A4.319) 
|
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
+ 𝑖4
1
𝑃𝑊1𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊1𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ 𝑖5
1
𝑃𝑊99𝑡
|
𝜕𝑃𝑊99𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
)
 
 
 
(A4.320) 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 = |
𝜕(𝐷/𝑌)𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= |
𝜕𝐷𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
1
𝑌𝑡
= (
𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
+ 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑊 |
𝜕𝑃𝑊𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
− 𝑡𝑡
𝐶 (|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
))
1
𝑌𝑡
 
(A4.321) 
 𝜕𝐷𝑡−1
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡−1
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 +Ψ(𝑡−1)(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
   (A4.322) 
|
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.323) 
 |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (A4.324) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.325) 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.326) 
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  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 |
𝑌𝑡
= 0 (A4.327) 
A4.7.3 The effect of a change in the taxes on wages on employment 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 (A4.328) 
  
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 
 
(A4.329) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 =  (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 
 
(A4.330) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  (A4.331) 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  
(A4.332) 
 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑒𝑇𝑊(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀
+ (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  
(A4.333) 
A4.7.4 The effect of a change in the taxes on wages on public debt 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑊 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑊 (A4.334) 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑊  (A4.335) 
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Appendix 5. Stylised facts of the data 
  
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Observations
Y 1161.194 359.168 47
273.802 121.957 46
465.495 115.115 46
7.171 1.764 46
44.793 1.408 46
5.426 1.385 46
1.745 0.399 46
17.697 0.783 46
27.096 1.088 46
13.143 4.217 46
20.321 3.626 46
11.017 4.144 46
15.874 3.825 46
1.621 0.256 46
1.519 0.222 46
29.913 9.006 47
684.148 254.500 47
174.792 47.024 47
110.120 11.600 47
32.162 9.919 47
142.017 48.692 47
M 276.036 167.121 47
X 265.690 143.665 47
1019.177 311.513 47
0.122 0.008 47
0.102 0.025 47
0.030 0.013 47
22.473 6.613 46
0.755 0.020 46
0.395 0.014 46
412.358 121.270 47
0.406 0.026 47
25.102 1.433 47
29.881 5.084 47
t
PW 1.286 0.426 47
t
C 18.494 1.405 47
D/Y 0.516 0.171 47
PW 4359.685 2413.936 47
PW1 852.214 513.752 47
PW99 3507.471 1914.337 47
λ 0.196 0.033 47
41700000000000 16700000000000 47
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Appendix 6. Estimation results with instrumental variables 
 
Table A6.1 Regression results for Consumption in N and H 
Dependent variable ΔlogCN ΔlogCH  
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value  
Constant 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.091  
Δlog(Rt(1-tRt)) 0.058 0.052 0.001 0.993  
Δlog(WBFt(1-tWt)) 0.139 0.092 0.292 0.168  
Δlog(WBMt(1-tWt)) 0.373 0.002 0.224 0.452  
Δlog(PW99t(1-tPWt)) 0.172 0.009 -0.089 0.586  
Δlog(PW1t(1-tPWt)) -0.005 0.861 -0.016 0.834  
Adj. R2 0.681  0.067   
DW statistic 1.504618  1.406538   
Sample 1975 2015  1975 2015   
Note: Instruments are wF, α, β in H and N, tR, tW, tPW, all in t, t-1, t-2  
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares   
 
Table A6.2 Regression results for private investment 
Dependent variable ΔlogI   
Variable Coeff. p-value   
Constant -1.800 0.001   
Δlog(πt(1-tRt)) 0.081 0.543   
ΔlogYt 1.730 0.033   
Δlog(PW1t(1-tPWt)) -0.213 0.079   
Δlog(PW99t(1-tPWt)) 0.415 0.122   
Δlog(D/Y)t -0.167 0.249   
logIt-1 -0.322 0.000   
logYt-1 0.6395 0.0002   
log(PW1t-1(1-tPWt-1)) -0.161969 0.0078   
Adj. R2 0.714379    
DW statistic 1.735481    
Sample 1973 2015    
Note: Instruments are wF, α, β in H and N, tR, tW, tPW, all in t, t-1, t-2 
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares with ECM   
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Table A6.3 Regression results for exports 
Dependent variable ΔlogX  
Variable Coeff. p-value  
Constant -0.020 0.074  
Δlog(πt) 0.100 0.422  
ΔlogYWorldt 1.992 0.000  
Adj. R2 0.494   
DW statistic 1.643   
Sample 1973 2015   
Note: Instruments are Instruments are wF, α, β in H and N, tR, tW, tPW,, and Yworld,  all in t, t-1, t-
2 
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
 
Table A6.4 Regression results for 
imports   
Dependent variable ΔlogM   
Variable Coeff. p-value   
Constant -1.915 0.048   
Δlog(πt) -0.191 0.197   
ΔlogYNt 1.502 0.000   
logMt-1 -0.241 0.038   
logYNt-1 0.470 0.043   
Adj. R2 0.638    
DW statistic 2.409    
Sample 1973 2015    
Note: Instruments are wF, α, β in H and N, tR, tW, tPW, all in t, t-1, t-2 
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares with 
ECM   
 
 
